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executive Summary
on June 7, 2011, on a stretch of North carolina highway between raleigh and Durham, Jesús Martínez Benitez, 32, 
and luis castaneda Gómez, 34, were work-
ing on installation of new water mains. The two 
worked alone at their assigned task: descending 
into an underground bunker that housed valves 
critical to the water lines’ operation. When co-
workers came to pick up Benitez and Gómez, 
they found the men slumped inside the four-by-
six foot bunker, 12 feet below ground. Both had 
died of asphyxiation, most likely the result of one 
of the men passing out in the low-oxygen en-
closed space and the other making the fatal deci-
sion to rush to save him without adequate protec-
tion. The company that employed Benitez and 
Gómez had a history of violating occupational 
health and safety (oHS) laws, including failing to 
train workers on how to avoid unsafe conditions. 
Sadly, the men’s deaths, like thousands of others 
every year, were completely preventable. 
cold comfort though it may be to their families, 
friends, and co-workers, Benitez’s and Gómez’s 
deaths helped advocates propel a new ordi-
nance through the Durham city council that 
requires potential contractors to answer detailed 
questions about their compliance records and 
safety plans. The ordinance will help ensure that 
future contracts do not go to companies that 
disregard their duties to protect workers.
Such reforms are emblematic of the progress 
that can be made at the state and local level 
when workers and their advocates are prepared 
to offer practical solutions and policymakers are 
ready to act. In this manual, we outline nearly 
two dozen proposals for state and local policy 
reform that would empower workers, fix oHS 
laws, and strengthen the agencies that strive to 
promote workplace safety. Some proposals are 
simple to understand and self-contained, that is, 
they focus narrowly on problems with oHS laws 
or agencies. for example, beginning on page 
35, we describe how the fines for violating oHS 
laws are too weak to provide strong deterrent 
effects and should be strengthened so that the 
punishment not only fits the crime but also in-
duces other employers to be more conscientious 
about their oHS-related responsibilities. 
other proposals in these pages are more 
ambitious, addressing serious problems with 
solutions that would fundamentally change the 
relationship between workers, employers, and 
government enforcement agencies. for exam-
ple, giving workers the right to sue their employ-
ers for violating oHS standards (discussed at p. 
27) and establishing corporate manslaughter 
laws (see p. 42) are policies that might only be 
adopted by truly progressive state legislatures 
under pressure from workers and a strong co-
alition of allies. 
We present this broad range of proposals so 
that workers and their advocates have a full 
menu of ideas to consider. The manual is divid-
ed into three main chapters and 14 individual 
sections, each addressing a particular problem 
and outlining progressive solutions to that prob-
lem. The individual solutions are designed to 
stand on their own so that workers and their ad-
vocates can refer to individual sections without 
having to read the manual cover to cover.
In chapter 1, we focus on empowering work-
ers, addressing five topics: health and safety 
committees that effectively involve workers in 
preventing occupational injuries and illnesses; 
education and training designed to provide 
workers a knowledge base for action; improved 
protections for whistleblowers; the right to refuse 
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unsafe work; and statutes that would give work-
ers and their advocates the power to sue em-
ployers for failure to abide by oHS standards 
and regulations.
In chapter 2, we turn our attention to making 
sure that companies tempted to cut corners 
on worker safety know that they can expect to 
pay a high price for doing so. We identify ways 
to strengthen the criminal and civil penalties 
imposed on employers that do not comply with 
oHS standards, reform laws so that employers 
must correct dangerous conditions as soon as 
they receive citations from oHS inspectors, and 
utilize government statistics to engage in “sham-
ing” campaigns against scofflaw employers.
In chapter 3, we set our sights on the govern-
ment agencies that can promote improved 
occupational health and safety. In addition to 
suggesting improved oversight of oHS agencies 
and better procedures for investigating occu-
pational fatalities, we address how other agen-
cies could bolster the work of officials who are 
directly empowered by oHS laws. Government 
contracting and procurement decisions, for 
instance, should take better account of bidders’ 
oHS programs. code-enforcement agencies, 
like fire marshals and building inspectors, could 
partner with oHS agencies to expand oversight.
We encourage workers and their advocates to 
use this manual as a starting point for discus-
sions about how the ideas presented here corre-
late to their individual and organizational goals. 
We focus on changes to laws and policies that 
are designed to prevent occupational injuries 
and illnesses, not the safety nets available to 
workers after they are hurt (e.g., workers’ com-
pensation, tort law, and disability insurance). 
Those safety nets are important, but space and 
resource constraints prevent us from addressing 
them here. This manual also does not address 
organizing strategies, research and resource 
needs, partnership opportunities, or other is-
sues necessary for successful campaigns, since 
those issues depend on local factors. Such work 
is vital, but we focus here on the ideas around 
which such campaigns might be built.
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Introduction
Despite notable improvements in occupa-tional health and safety over the last few decades, far too many workers still suffer 
on-the-job injuries and illnesses that could have 
been prevented. four to five thousand workers 
die on the job each year, an average of more 
than 10 every day. The number of workers who 
suffer occupational injuries or illnesses each 
year is hundreds of times the number who die 
on the job.1 The sad truth is that the people who 
bear the brunt of unsafe working conditions 
are increasingly the working poor, immigrants, 
and others struggling simply to put food on the 
table and keep a roof overhead. These victims 
and their equally at-risk co-workers have both 
a real and a perceived lack of power in rela-
tion to their employers, leaving them unable 
to demand the engineering controls, improved 
work practices, and other actions that employers 
should take to eliminate occupational hazards. 
That is precisely why strong laws and regula-
tions are so critical. Workers’ advocates—
unions, local worker centers, legal aid organiza-
tions, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and a variety of other 
public interest groups—are a powerful force 
for stronger safeguards, as evidenced by many 
hard-fought victories over the years. 
chief among those victories was passage of the 
occupational Safety and Health act (oSH act) 
of 1970. a watershed achievement, the oSH 
act established the basic structure of today’s 
occupational health and safety (oHS) regulatory 
system:  The federal occupational Safety and 
Health administration (fed-oSHa) has the pow-
er to write health and safety standards and to 
enforce them through unannounced workplace 
inspections and a graduated system of civil and 
criminal penalties; employers can challenge al-
leged violations through an administrative pro-
cess overseen by the independent occupational 
Safety and Health review commission; and, 
critically, individual states can opt to establish 
their own oHS agencies that take the place of 
fed-oSHa so long as the “state-plan” agency 
is at least as effective as fed-oSHa in carrying 
out congress’s mandate to “assure so far as 
possible every working man and woman in the 
Nation safe and healthful working conditions.”2   
The oSH act also preserved individual states’ 
workers’ compensation programs. In the 
early part of the 20th century, state legislatures 
throughout the United States enacted new laws 
that limited workers’ right to sue their employ-
ers following an on-the-job injury or the onset 
of an occupational illness. With limited access 
to the courts, workers instead file claims for 
compensation, which are resolved through an 
administrative process. critically, workers do not 
need to prove that an employer was at fault to 
obtain compensation, so the workers’ compen-
sation system is—theoretically—a simpler route 
to recovering the costs of occupational injuries 
and illnesses than was the process of suing an 
employer in court. for employers, the work-
ers’ compensation system provides some level 
of cost control and predictability, since work-
ers’ compensation payments are disbursed by 
insurance providers rather than the employer. 
The oSH act was designed to complement the 
workers’ compensation system—oHS standards 
should prevent many occupational injuries 
and illnesses, while the workers’ compensation 
system should provide medical care and finan-
cial compensation when workers are injured. In 
practice, some injured workers receive prompt 
and adequate compensation, while others face 
substantial hurdles and may never receive the 
compensation they should get (see the appendix 
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for more on shortcomings in the workers’ com-
pensation system).
The oSH act, as implemented by fed-oSHa 
and its state-plan partners, has succeeded in 
reducing overall injury and illness rates signifi-
cantly over the last 45 years. But the act is im-
perfect, the agencies struggle to fulfill their mis-
sion with insufficient resources, and workers still 
face substantial oHS risks. By some measures, 
we have hit a plateau in our collective efforts to 
ensure safe and healthful working conditions for 
all. This is not because workplace health and 
safety is an unachievable goal. rather, the bet-
ter explanation is that our current oHS system 
needs reforms to address the changing nature 
of work in the United States and the changing 
role of government in our lives. 
one of the most significant economic trends af-
fecting workers’ health and safety is the increas-
ing mobility of the workforce. It has become 
rare for a worker to spend an entire career 
with a single company, and transient workers 
have less bargaining power than long-term 
employees. In fact, such major retail compa-
nies as Walmart and amazon employ hundreds 
of thousands of workers through their supply 
chains but rely increasingly on staffing agencies 
to fill their labor needs—a strategy that allows 
them to change the size of their workforce on a 
day-to-day basis, while also passing the buck 
on oHS and workers’ compensation responsi-
bilities. changes to the way government works 
have also slowed progress toward safer work-
places. The federal rulemaking process is so 
ossified, so paralyzed, that fed-oSHa is, for 
all intents and purposes, unable to begin work 
on even a single new standard and finalize that 
standard within any one presidential adminis-
tration. 
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The good news is that workers’ advocates at the 
state and local levels are mounting successful 
worker safety campaigns on a regular basis. In 
recent years, at the urging of advocates, state 
and local governments have tackled a wide 
range of issues, including the following:
• after two workers died while working inside 
a manhole on a city-funded job with a com-
pany that had racked up dozens of health 
and safety citations, Durham, North carolina 
adopted a new policy for choosing companies 
to complete city projects. companies bidding 
for the contracts are now required to provide 
information on their safety and health pro-
grams, injury data, and workers’ compensa-
tion rates.
• In response to temporary workers encounter-
ing problems getting payment or workers’ 
compensation from temporary staffing agen-
cies, Massachusetts passed the Temporary 
Workers right to know act. Now, staffing 
agencies must provide workers with written in-
formation about their job assignments, health 
and safety training requirements, protective 
equipment that should be available, wages, 
and information about the staffing agency 
and its workers’ compensation carrier. 
• following a newspaper series on cancer-
stricken health care workers and a campaign 
by health care workers and other advocates, 
Washington State adopted a regulation to 
protect health care workers from exposure to 
chemotherapy agents and other hazardous 
drugs. employers whose workers may be ex-
posed to such drugs (e.g., through touching, 
breathing, or needle sticks) are now required 
to develop control programs with procedures 
for the drugs’ storage, use, and disposal.
• Waste recycling workers face a multitude of 
health and safety hazards. Some have been 
fatally injured. In california, Worksafe, the In-
ternational longshore Warehouse Union, the 
east Bay alliance for a Sustainable economy, 
and other allies pressured municipalities to 
require that new franchise agreements with 
waste collection and recycling companies in-
clude provisions ensuring these workers earn 
decent wages and benefits and are protected 
from dangerous working conditions. accord-
ingly, oakland and fremont city councils 
passed resolutions in early 2014 that direct 
their city managers to address these issues 
when negotiating contracts.
These groups and their counterparts in other 
cities and states throughout the country have 
the opportunity to transform oHS policies in 
ways that, largely for political reasons, have not 
worked at the national level. In doing so, they 
may provide the momentum that is needed to 
push congress and others to establish better 
protections for all workers. National right-to-
know laws, which promote better understand-
ing of chemical hazards in the workplace, for 
instance, came to be adopted only after workers 
and their allies succeeded in passing similar 
laws at the state and local levels in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. The proposals described in the 
pages that follow could be a starting point for 
discussions among workers and their advocates 
about the next generation of oHS reforms. Suc-
cess at the local and state levels could again lay 
the groundwork for national reform.
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How to Use This Manual 
This manual is intended for workers’ advo-cates who want to press their state legisla-tors, state agencies, and local officials to 
adopt laws and policies that will better protect 
workers from occupational health and safety 
hazards. each section of the manual has four 
principle pieces:  a description of a problem, a 
proposed solution or interrelated set of solu-
tions, notes on challenges related to the pro-
posed solutions, and some useful examples. We 
cite some examples of national-scale efforts to 
reform the oSH act or fed-oSHa policies, but 
these references are intended only to provide 
guidance on the substance of the proposals. 
Given the deadlock in the U.S. congress and 
the slow pace of action at fed-oSHa, this man-
ual proceeds from the premise that for now, 
state and local advocacy is the best approach to 
testing the solutions outlined below.
The manual outlines a menu of ideas from 
which state and local advocates might choose 
issues around which to build campaigns. We 
have steered away from ideas centered on 
particular hazards, focusing instead on cross-
cutting issues designed to empower workers, 
eliminate the economic benefits of ignoring the 
law, and strengthen the institutions that enforce 
the law. We have also limited our discussion 
of workers’ compensation, tort law, disability 
benefits, and other “safety net” programs that 
provide benefits to workers who have suffered 
occupational injuries or illnesses. other individ-
uals and organizations in the community have 
applied their expertise to such topics; our main 
focus here is on laws and standards that will 
prevent tragedies in the workplace.
We want to emphasize that this manual is 
merely a starting point for collaborative discus-
sions about improving oHS conditions. our 
hope is that organizations operating at the state 
and local levels will use the manual to prompt 
discussions among worker-members and client 
groups about their most significant oHS con-
cerns. So we present a broad array of ideas, 
some more readily achievable than others, but 
all with the potential to transform the way work-
ers, the public, and lawmakers approach the 
issue of occupational health and safety.
The manual does not discuss organizing strate-
gies, research and resource needs, partnership 
opportunities, or other issues that undergird 
successful campaigns. local conditions dictate 
how best to achieve campaign goals, so discus-
sion of those issues is beyond the scope of this 
document. again, others in the community have 
greater expertise on organizing strategies; we 
stick to policies in these pages.
recognizing the vibrant community of workers’ 
advocates who have achieved success in many 
arenas but may be new to the world of fed-
oSHa and state-plan oHS agencies, we have 
included a short overview of the oSH act and 
workers’ compensation at the end of the docu-
ment. It begins on page 74.
advocates who are interested in campaigning 
for any of the reforms discussed in this manual 
should prepare for employers to argue that fed-
eral law “preempts” new state laws or regula-
tions. While a detailed discussion of preemption 
is beyond the scope of this manual, we provide 
a brief overview and note special preemption-
related issues at appropriate points in the 
recommendation sections below. We urge advo-
cates to consult with an expert on the preemp-
tion issue as they prepare to campaign for any 
of the solutions recommended in this manual.
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In general, state-plan states have substantial lee-
way to expand upon the minimum oHS require-
ments set by fed-oSHa, while states covered by 
fed-oSHa are more constrained. These prin-
ciples are derived from the U.S. Supreme court’s 
1992 Gade (pronounced “Gay-dee”) decision, 
in which the court ruled that if fed-oSHa has is-
sued a standard covering a particular oHS issue, 
only state-plan states may establish their own 
standards on that issue. legislators in states un-
der fed-oSHa’s jurisdiction are therefore limited 
to writing laws that address issues not covered by 
a fed-oSHa standard. The Supreme court also 
left open the possibility that “laws of general ap-
plicability,” which are aimed at enhancing public 
safety (not just worker safety) and only regulate 
employers insofar as they are members of the 
general public, may not be preempted by fed-
oSHa standards.
To help clarify where preemption is a significant 
hurdle, we have included symbols at the begin-
ning of each “Solution” section of the manual.
 The solid map of the United States 
icon indicates that the proposed 
solution is possible in both state-
plan states and states within fed-
oSHa’s jurisdiction.
 The green map of the United 
States icon indicates that the pro-
posed solution is only possible in 
state-plan states.
See the appendix, at p.74, for a more detailed 
description of fed-oSHa and state-plan juris-
diction
State-plan state
fed-oSHa
State-plan for public sector only
Occupational Health and Safety Jurisdiction
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chapter 1: Empowering workers
experience shows that when workers are empowered—when they act collectively to influence working conditions—positive 
change is eminently possible. To truly empower 
workers would require revolutionary changes 
to the labor market, political institutions, and 
the social safety net. But within the boundaries 
of occupational health and safety (oHS) law 
and policy, workers’ advocates can campaign 
for targeted reforms that give workers more 
power with respect to individual employers—
an important step in long-term organizing 
efforts. In this section, we describe health and 
safety committees, expanded oHS education 
and training requirements, stronger whistle-
blower protections, and “citizen suits” as prom-
ising campaign issues that hold the potential 
to generate real power for workers to demand 
changes from their employers.
The reforms in this section are designed to 
empower workers to act without having to rely 
on state or federal oHS agencies. The federal 
occupational Safety and Health adminis-
tration’s (fed-oSHa’s) total budget and the 
pass-through funds that go to support state-
plan oHS agencies have never been sufficient 
to protect workers and have failed to keep up 
with inflation and changes in the workplace, 
preventing fed-oSHa and state-plan oHS 
agencies from maintaining an inspection work-
force that keeps pace with the growing U.S. 
economy. The most striking way to illustrate 
how this resource shrinkage has played out is 
to look at how the ratio of oHS inspectors to 
workers has changed over time.3 In the late 
1970s, fed-oSHa had about 15 inspectors 
per 1 million workers, and even that was not 
enough to adequately enforce the law. Today, 
that number has dwindled to about seven 
inspectors per 1 million workers. These inspec-
tors are hardworking and dedicated to pro-
tecting workers, but there are simply too few 
of them to be the main bulwark against em-
ployers who create dangerous working condi-
tions. furthermore, government-created oHS 
standards are a floor upon which to build, not 
a ceiling intended to inhibit protections. Work-
ers can demand additional protections if they 
are empowered. The reforms outlined in this 
section will give more workers the power to 
demand the protections they deserve.
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Health and Safety Committees: Involving  
Workers in prevention
PROBLEM
Inadequate protection for workers against em-
ployer retaliation, incomplete training on work-
place hazards, difficulty stopping dangerous 
work, and myriad other problems that prevent 
workers from having safe and healthful work 
can all be linked to the large power dispar-
ity between workers and their employers. That 
power imbalance is related to the “representa-
tion/participation gap”—that is, the difference 
between the worker-management relationship 
that workers want and the relationship that they 
actually experience.4 one measure of the gap 
is the oft-cited decline in private-sector union 
participation, which has dropped from a high 
of about one-third of the private workforce 
in 1950 to less than 10 percent today. Some 
employers have experimented with different 
forms of non-union employee representation 
(e.g., Volkswagen’s “works councils”), but their 
mandates vary and oHS issues are not always a 
focal point.
SOLuTiOn
Joint labor-management health 
and safety committees can give 
workers a stronger voice in the 
oHS policies at their workplaces. 
State legislatures can adopt legislation—some 
have already—requiring employers to establish 
health and safety committees. Such legislation 
is possible in both state-plan states and states 
covered by fed-oSHa. even without legislation, 
committees can be established through a union 
contract or by collective action of a group of 
workers.
The basic concept of a health and safety 
committee is simple: a select group of non-
management workers at each worksite sits on 
a formal committee, alongside an equal or 
lesser number of management-selected repre-
sentatives. committee members meet regularly 
to discuss health and safety issues, including 
hazards related to equipment and chemicals, 
the effect of pace and duration of work on 
health and safety, and the workers’ education 
and training needs. committee members might 
conduct regular inspections or safety audits, 
review “close calls” (when injusties and fatali-
ties are narrowly avoided) and incident reports, 
or accompany oHS agency officials during an 
inspection. effective committees play an impor-
tant role in ensuring that hazards are identified 
and corrected through these activities, as well 
as by making formal recommendations on work 
practices and engineering controls. committees 
can also help implement whistleblower protec-
tions and workers’ rights to refuse dangerous 
work, as discussed below.
Health and safety committees hold great prom-
ise as a tool for giving workers more power 
over their working conditions. Worker involve-
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ment in health and safety policy decisions builds 
on workers’ expertise and knowledge and 
promotes localized, worksite-based problem 
solving. When the committees identify hazards 
and use their authority to pressure employ-
ers to fix problems, they have the potential to 
make health and safety improvements faster 
than could be achieved by filing a complaint to 
the relevant oHS agency and waiting for the 
inspection and appeals process to play out. and 
committees can protect whistleblowers by mak-
ing abatement recommendations or filing oHS 
complaints on their behalf and thereby shield-
ing them from managers who might retaliate.
State legislation can set forth critical aspects of 
health and safety committees, including:
n A size trigger
State laws on health and safety committees 
can establish a trigger that determines when a 
committee is required, based on the number of 
employees (e.g., committees are required for all 
employers with more than 5, 10, or 25 employ-
ees). The smaller the trigger the better, since 
there is evidence that, especially in high-hazard 
industries, small firms have worse safety records 
than larger firms.
n Structure
The size of the committee and its makeup can 
be flexible, within limits—employer representa-
tives must never outnumber worker representa-
tives, and, for large worksites, the number of 
worker representatives should be proportional 
to the number of workers (e.g., one worker 
representative for every 100 employees at a 
worksite with 500 or more employees).
n Membership
Worker representatives should be elected by 
workers for set terms, with the ability to serve 
multiple terms. at unionized worksites, worker 
representatives should be selected by the 
workers’ bargaining representative or union. 
contingent or temporary workers have unique 
concerns that should be represented in the com-
mittee’s membership, perhaps through a posi-
tion on the committee reserved for a contingent 
or temporary worker (who would be elected 
by other contingent workers). The chairperson 
for the committee should alternate between a 
management representative and a labor repre-
sentative.
n Compensation
Worker representatives should be paid their 
normal wages (including overtime, if appropri-
ate) for time spent on committee duties. 
n Locations
employers with multiple locations should have 
a committee at each location. exceptions may 
be appropriate for construction companies, 
trucking companies, or other firms that can be 
adequately served by a centralized committee.
n Frequency and conduct of meetings
committee meetings should happen on a fixed 
schedule (e.g., monthly). effective committees 
establish their own rules governing how agen-
das will be set, who will chair meetings, and 
how the minutes will be recorded.
n Duties and functions
The most important work for health and safety 
committees occurs outside of the regular meet-
ings. committees should develop policies and 
practices that encourage workers to identify 
and report hazards and ensure that employers 
do not have programs in place that discourage 
employees from reporting hazards or injuries. 
They should also ensure strong whistleblower 
protections and effective policies on the right 
to refuse dangerous work. committees should 
develop worksite-specific training requirements 
and tap the worker representatives on the com-
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mittee to act as peer trainers, delivering the 
worksite-specific training to their co-workers. 
To aid in the development of good training 
programs, the employer should pay for annual 
health and safety training for all worker repre-
sentatives on the committees. Health and safety 
committees should conduct investigations of 
incidents that led to injuries or fatalities, and act 
as a clearinghouse where workers can report 
“close call” incidents. The committee should 
investigate the incidents and make recommen-
dations for preventing similar incidents in the 
future.
n Recommendations
committees (and individual committee mem-
bers) should have the power to issue recom-
mendations to the employer on ways to correct 
hazards.
n Enforcement 
oHS agencies must have the power to cite em-
ployers that fail to ensure compliance with com-
mittee composition, activity, and recordkeeping 
requirements. This enforcement authority is 
critical to preventing “paper tiger” committees 
that do little to help workers.
Many states have adopted statutes that require 
employers to develop health and safety commit-
tees or create financial incentives for doing so. 
often, these requirements are tied to workers’ 
compensation programs, since committees can 
be an effective way to reduce oHS risks, which 
in turn reduces workers’ compensation costs. 
Most state legislatures have a recurring process 
in which they consider reforms to their work-
ers’ compensation programs on a biennial or 
some other regular basis. In recent years, much 
Mandatory requirement
Voluntary or public-sector only
Health and Safety Committee Requirements
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to the chagrin of workers and their advocates, 
these review cycles have tended to focus on 
cutting benefits and otherwise limiting workers’ 
compensation programs instead of strengthen-
ing them. Health and safety committee require-
ments have been a bright spot for workers, 
though. Many legislatures have included com-
mittee requirements in their workers’ compen-
sation reform efforts either as a concession to 
workers who are losing on other aspects of the 
legislation, or as a way to cut costs and create a 
more “business friendly” climate in their state.
CHALLEngES
The most serious issue standing in the way of 
health and safety committees is the potential 
conflict with the National labor relations act 
(Nlra). Written improperly, a state law requiring 
health and safety committees might demand a 
committee structure or set of duties that conflict 
with the Nlra, thereby invalidating the law. ad-
vocates who are considering pursuing a cam-
paign to establish health and safety committees 
should consult with an Nlra expert. 
Briefly, the issue is that the Nlra prohibits 
employers from interfering with or dominating 
labor organizations. a joint labor-management 
committee is likely to be considered a “labor 
organization” under the Nlra if it has mem-
bers who are elected by workers to deal with an 
issue—health and safety—that is a mandatory 
topic of bargaining under U.S. labor law. The 
Nlra’s prohibition on employers interfering 
with or dominating labor organizations would 
prevent an employer from contributing finan-
cial or other support to the committee. That 
would mean the committee could not meet on 
company property and workers’ representatives 
could not be paid for time spent on committee 
functions. practically speaking, there is no way 
the committee could function effectively. The 
relevant provision of the Nlra, section 8(a)(2), 
was intended to stop employers from forming 
“company unions,” a tactic employed in the 
early part of the 20th century to disrupt union 
organizing. But because of the broad language 
of the Nlra, modern-day programs intended 
to give workers more power over their working 
conditions can run afoul of the law. a full dis-
cussion of the relevant law is beyond the scope 
of this document, but the key takeaway is that 
there are ways to work around the Nlra prob-
lem. It is possible to structure the committees 
and their powers in a way that ensures man-
agement does not dominate or interfere with 
the committee’s work, thereby securing com-
pliance with the Nlra. as outlined below, 23 
states require or encourage the establishment of 
health and safety committees. labor law experts 
can help workers’ advocates design state legis-
lation in a way that ensures compliance with the 
Nlra, while accomplishing the goal of requir-
ing health and safety committees.
When congress considered amending the oSH 
act in the early 1990s to include a requirement 
that all employers with more than ten employ-
ees establish health and safety committees, 
trade associations and their member companies 
objected on other grounds.5  as with any pro-
posal designed to benefit workers, employers 
raised concerns about costs. But they came up 
with inflated numbers that were hard to recon-
cile with cost analyses produced by fed-oSHa 
and state agencies that had recently established 
health and safety committee mandates. em-
ployers also argued that they should have the 
flexibility to decide whether to establish a health 
and safety committee, not a mandate. However, 
employers are unlikely to establish voluntarily 
the committee structures, policies, and proce-
dures that ensure meaningful worker involve-
ment and effective committees. a formal study 
conducted for the Department of labor con-
cluded that voluntary committees often amount 
to little more than “paper tigers.”6 and a more 
recent study of health and safety committees 
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established under pennsylvania’s voluntary 
program found that too much flexibility can lead 
to ineffective committees.7 Nonetheless, some 
flexibility can be written into the law by giving 
employers the opportunity to seek variances 
from the law’s requirements upon a showing 
that their programs are at least as effective as 
the statute’s requirements. (legislation based on 
a strict mandate also helps minimize the Nlra 
problem because an employer is less likely to be 
found to illegally “dominate” a committee when 
the employer did not voluntarily create it.)  
ExAMPLES
Mine workers bargained to establish the first 
joint labor-management committees with a 
health and safety aspect to their work over a 
century ago. Since then, thousands of compa-
nies in many different industries have voluntarily 
created such committees, labor unions have 
bargained for their establishment in many con-
tracts, and 23 states have adopted some form 
of law or policy that encourages their forma-
tion. In the early 1990s, members of the U.S. 
congress introduced two bills that would have 
amended the oSH act to require employers 
with 11 or more employees to form health and 
safety committees.8 The bills provide a useful 
example of legislative language that sets the 
basic parameters for health and safety commit-
tees that would be effective and would fit within 
the constraints of the Nlra. 
advocates might also find successful models for 
health and safety committees where they were 
created without a statutory mandate but are 
overseen by oHS experts. for instance, many 
collective bargaining agreements have health 
and safety committee requirements that were 
designed by unions’ oHS experts. 
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems
In this manual, we present recommendations about health and safety committees separately 
from recommendations about improved education and training, but the two issues are closely 
related. In many workplaces, both effective joint labor-management health and safety com-
mittees and job-specific training programs are part of a comprehensive occupational health 
and safety management system, sometimes referred to as an injury and illness prevention 
program (I2p2). 
occupational health and safety management systems vary in design, but the most effective 
systems share a core set of features that include management leadership, employee par-
ticipation, planning, implementation and operation, evaluation and corrective action, and 
management review. (See the american National Standards Institute (aNSI) Z10 consensus 
standard.)
Thirty-four states either require employers to establish occupational health and safety man-
agement systems or have guidelines that encourage them. fed-oSHa maintains a website 
with links to the programs, which may be a useful resource for advocates interested in pur-
suing reforms related to health and safety committees or improved education and training 
requirements. (https://www.osha.gov/dsg/topics/safetyhealth/states.html)
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Education and Training: providing Workers a 
knowledge Base for action
PROBLEM
Too often, workers get incomplete information 
and insufficient training from their employers. 
To stay safe on the job, workers need to know 
about the hazards they may encounter, how to 
perform their job tasks safely, and what they 
can do to address unsafe conditions or ac-
cess workers’ compensation after suffering a 
job-related injury or illness. Various laws and 
regulations require employers to make specific 
kinds of information available and provide cer-
tain types of training, but these piecemeal rules 
often leave workers with only a partial under-
standing of the hazards they face, their employ-
ers’ duties to eliminate or manage the hazards, 
and how to exercise their rights. 
The problem of insufficient oHS education and 
training is especially acute in the sectors of the 
labor market that have made widespread use of 
temporary labor. Take, for example, the tragic 
death of Day Davis at the Bacardi bottling plant 
in Jacksonville, florida. Hired as a temp worker 
and eager to prove his mettle on his first day 
at a new job, Davis was crushed by a piece 
of equipment that was set to run while he was 
underneath it cleaning broken bottles. among 
other violations, fed-oSHa determined that 
Bacardi had failed to train Davis on the haz-
ards associated with the equipment or safe use 
procedures—such as cutting power to machines 
when workers are making repairs or cleaning 
up.9 Insufficient training has been an issue in so 
many cases involving temporary workers in the 
last few years that fed-oSHa has taken steps to 
clarify the joint responsibilities of staffing agen-
cies and host employers with regard to training 
requirements.10
further complicating matters, training, warn-
ing signs, and hazard communications are not 
always in the language or format best suited 
for the workers who are supposed to benefit 
from them. Improper language and format is 
an acute problem in industries or geographical 
regions that rely heavily on foreign-born work-
ers or those with low literacy.
 SOLuTiOn
Improvements to education and 
training requirements can ensure 
that workers have the knowledge 
they need to demand better oHS 
protections. To get a full picture of the health 
and safety aspects of their jobs, workers need 
to know about all potential hazards, past and 
present exposures to any hazards that may be 
variable (e.g., chemical exposures), the type 
and severity of the harm the hazard can cause, 
the regulatory and legal system that places re-
sponsibility on employers to eliminate hazards, 
and the mechanisms for redress when injuries 
or illnesses occur. State legislatures can enact 
laws that provide for oHS information-sharing 
and training. Unions can also make these de-
mands in contract negotiations, but the recom-
mendations below focus on statutory changes 
that would help non-unionized workers, too.
State legislators in every state can take the 
simple, commonsense step of requiring employ-
ers to inform workers about the education and 
training requirements that apply to their jobs. 
This requirement would force employers to 
regularly review the oHS standards relevant to 
their industries and keep track of the training re-
quirements that apply to all jobs that their work-
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ers undertake. fed-oSHa has more than 100 
standards that mandate some type of training 
for workers across a range of industries.11 only 
a small number might apply to a given job, but 
it is the employer’s responsibility to know what 
those requirements are and to ensure they com-
ply with them. State laws mandating that em-
ployers disclose to workers the relevant training 
regulations would also provide workers with a 
virtual checklist that they could use to keep tabs 
on whether their employer is providing sufficient 
oHS training.
only state-plan states’ legislators should at-
tempt to expand on fed-oSHa’s education and 
training requirements. The oSH act’s preemp-
tion provisions bar legislators in states covered 
by fed-oSHa from adding to the federal oHS 
education and training requirements. State-plan 
states that opt to expand on the minimum fed-
eral standards could greatly enhance workers’ 
knowledge of oHS hazards by requiring a more 
comprehensive hazard analysis and communi-
cation program. critical elements of that pro-
gram might include:
n A mechanism for providing all new 
hires with OHS-specific training 
legislators should outline in general terms the 
minimum requirements of new-hire training 
and should authorize the state’s oHS agency to 
establish regulations and guidance that will pro-
vide employers with additional details. legisla-
tion could set out a minimum number of hours 
for training on hazards and on the employer’s 
duties to eliminate and manage those hazards 
(e.g., eight hours for new hires). It could also 
mandate that workers receive training on best 
practices for identifying hazards and the pro-
cedures for reporting hazards to management, 
refusing unsafe work, and reporting unresolved 
problems to government agencies.12 as de-
scribed above, joint labor-management health 
and safety committees can be responsible for 
developing worksite-specific training materials, 
and worker representatives on those committees 
can be responsible for training other workers.
n A requirement that ensures workers 
get “refresher” and “new task” 
training 
refresher training reinforces to employers that 
they bear the ultimate responsibility for workers’ 
health and safety. It also gives workers an op-
portunity to refresh their knowledge of hazards 
and the ways they are supposed to be elimi-
nated or controlled, to discuss new or emerging 
hazards, and to review policies and procedures 
for dealing with oHS concerns. employers also 
should be required to provide specialized train-
ing any time workers are assigned new tasks or 
begin using new equipment. 
n Expanded access to injury and illness 
records
State legislatures could improve access to indi-
vidual firms’ injury and illness records, such as 
oSHa-300 logs, company audits, and workers’ 
compensation records, by requiring that the 
data be posted online through the state-plan 
oHS agency’s website (without revealing work-
ers’ identities). Doing so would enable workers 
to access the data at the time and place of their 
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choosing. It would also allow potential employ-
ees, customers, competitors, contractors, suppli-
ers, and the media to access the data, increas-
ing the number of potential actors who might 
press a firm with high injury and illness rates to 
take action to create a safer workplace.
a comprehensive hazard analysis and com-
munication program could be tied to the work 
of health and safety committees. for instance, 
the health and safety committee could develop 
training programs, conduct training, and verify 
effectiveness. Worker representatives on the 
committee also could serve as a resource for 
co-workers who need help understanding the 
oHS-related information that employers might 
be required to provide.
State lawmakers in all states can also mandate 
that employers provide workers with information 
about the other key program relevant to their 
on-the-job health and safety: workers’ compen-
sation. Most states require employers to put up 
posters that give workers rudimentary informa-
tion about the workers’ compensation system, 
such as the name of the employer’s workers’ 
compensation insurer and claims administra-
tor.13 But workers deserve to know more than 
just the basics, including:
• The process for filing a claim, including rel-
evant timelines and documentation require-
ments;
• Information about benefits available through 
the workers’ compensation system, including 
a clear statement describing benefits that will 
be unavailable if a claim is not filed;
• The percentage of claims that the employer 
or its insurer appeals, so that workers will 
know ahead of time the employer’s track re-
cord for challenging workers’ compensation 
claims; and
• a disclosure about workers’ rights to enlist 
an attorney at any time after the injury, to 
help navigate the complicated procedures for 
obtaining benefits.
Workers also need to know about whistleblower 
protections, their legal protections when they 
refuse unsafe work, the proper channels for 
raising oHS concerns in the workplace, and 
how to file a complaint with an oHS agency 
if hazardous conditions are not satisfactorily 
addressed. (The two sections of this manual 
immediately following this section provide de-
tails on whistleblower protections and refusing 
unsafe work.) These issues can be addressed in 
plain-language documents provided to workers 
before the first day on the job and on an annual 
basis thereafter, as well as on a prominently 
displayed poster within the workplace.
fed-oSHa and various state-plan oHS agen-
cies provide sample documents that employers 
can use to educate workers, often in english 
and Spanish. State lawmakers in all states 
should mandate that employers educate and 
train workers in a language and vocabulary that 
they understand.
CHALLEngES
The first counter-argument that advocates 
should expect to hear when pushing for im-
proved oHS education and training require-
ments is that fed-oSHa regulations preempt 
states from acting. This argument is primarily a 
concern in states that do not have a fed-oSHa-
approved state plan. The U.S. Supreme court, 
in its 1992 Gade decision,14 invalidated an 
Illinois regulation that established certain train-
ing and certification requirements beyond what 
fed-oSHa’s standards required. The court’s 
ruling creates a barrier to expanding oHS 
education and training requirements in states 
where fed-oSHa has authority. Nonetheless, 
legislators in states covered by fed-oSHa might 
work around this problem by mandating that 
employers simply inform workers of the educa-
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tion and training requirements that apply under 
fed-oSHa’s standards. By not adding new 
education or training requirements, the problem 
of preemption may be avoided.
for workers, the problem with improved oHS 
education and training requirements is that, 
in reality, knowledge is not power—power 
is power. Workers need a mechanism that 
gives them an enforceable power to demand 
improved working conditions, based on the 
information they receive through improved oHS 
education and training requirements. This need 
is addressed by some of the other recommen-
dations in this document, including the creation 
of workplace health and safety committees with 
genuine worker involvement, the enhanced 
whistleblower protections, the establishment of a 
right to refuse dangerous work, and citizen-suit 
provisions. Those recommendations go hand-
in-hand with improved oHS education and 
training requirements, which would strengthen 
workers’ ability to use those tools.
ExAMPLES
In 2012, the Governor of Massachusetts signed 
a law known as the Massachusetts Temporary 
Worker’s right to know act, which was designed 
to combat a number of problems that plague 
the temporary or third-party labor market. one 
of those problems is that temp workers are often 
sent to jobs without any knowledge of what they 
will be doing or what health and safety protec-
tions they should expect. The Temporary Work-
ers right to know act therefore requires staffing 
agencies to provide workers with “job orders” 
that include, among other things, disclosure of 
whether the position requires special clothing, 
tools, licensing, or training.15 This type of reform 
could be enacted in any state because it does 
not expand on fed-oSHa standards; it merely 
requires an employer to explain the duties it 
owes workers.
california’s workers’ compensation regulations 
provide a useful example of state disclosure 
requirements that relate specifically to workers’ 
compensation. employers must post in each 
workplace a one-page poster that provides 
workers with an easy-to-understand overview of 
the workers’ compensation claims process, as 
well as some basic information necessary to ini-
tiate the process, such as the employer’s claims 
administrator, workers’ compensation insurer, 
and contact information for individuals who can 
advise injured workers.16 even more useful, cali-
fornia requires employers to provide workers 
with a “Time of Hire” pamphlet that explains the 
workers’ compensation system in more detail, 
but still in plain, easy-to-understand language.17 
A win for workers:  The 
Massachusetts Temporary 
worker Right to Know Act
a Massachusetts coalition of faith lead-
ers, labor organizations, and safety and 
other advocacy groups worked with state 
agencies and representatives of the staff-
ing industry on legislation to better protect 
temporary workers from employer abuse. 
far too many low-wage temp workers 
are not told what their job will be or how 
much they will be paid. The new state law, 
which took effect in January 2013, re-
quires staffing agencies to provide tem-
porary workers basic information about 
their job assignments; name and contact 
information about the staffing agency; its 
workers’ compensation carrier; and any 
special clothing, tools, and safety training 
for each job assignment.
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whistleblower Protection Laws: Deputizing 
Workers to Identify and report Hazards
PROBLEM
Workers face powerful disincentives to raise 
oHS concerns. Those who do may face retali-
ation, including having their hours cut or being 
fired. Indeed, some employers overtly threaten 
workers with such consequences if they report 
health and safety problems. Workers may also 
face retaliation for filing workers’ compensa-
tion claims for injuries and illnesses that occur 
because of unsafe work environments. all these 
forms of retaliation are illegal, but workers 
report that they occur often.
fear of retaliation can strongly discourage 
workers from reporting oHS concerns or from 
filing workers’ compensation claims. The fear of 
retaliation can be greatest for vulnerable, low-
wage workers, particularly those working on a 
contingent basis, with limited english language 
skills, or without protection from a union con-
tract. Beyond employer retaliation, those work-
ers brave enough to report oHS problems to 
management or a public agency have paid a 
heavy toll, including strained relations with fam-
ily members and former co-workers, financial 
struggles, and extreme emotional trauma.18
all states have some form of whistleblower 
protection law, though they vary widely in their 
scope and implementation.19 a state law’s nar-
row coverage or weak remedies can discour-
age workers from reporting oHS hazards when 
they fear retaliation. for instance, state laws 
vary with respect to the back pay and benefits 
that whistleblowers can recover if an employer 
illegally retaliates. When state statutes establish 
a system that relies heavily or exclusively on 
overburdened government agencies to act as 
the gatekeepers for whistleblower claims, poor 
implementation can also be a huge discourage-
ment.20 across the country, agencies responsible 
for reviewing whistleblower complaints have 
significant backlogs. Workers can look to the 
protections afforded by more than 20 federal 
whistleblower laws, though fed-oSHa is strug-
gling to manage the caseload that comes with 
such broad jurisdiction.21
as the eyes and ears on the ground, workers 
are the experts in identifying workplace hazards 
and recommending fixes before injury or illness 
occurs. This whistleblowing role is critical as 
oHS agencies’ budgets dwindle, since fewer 
inspectors, combined with weak penalty provi-
sions in the law, make it less likely that employ-
ers who break the law will be punished severely 
enough to discourage them from breaking the 
law in the future.   
SOLuTiOn
every state, whether operating 
under a state plan or fed-oSHa’s 
authority, can improve its whistle-
blower protection laws and make 
management changes to ensure improved en-
forcement of both new and existing laws. Strong 
whistleblower protection laws must shield work-
ers against employer retaliation and encourage 
them to identify and report oHS hazards. Such 
laws are necessary to counter the disincen-
tives that potential whistleblowers face. Society 
has a strong interest in rooting out hazardous 
workplaces because of the costs they impose on 
public health and safety.
a strong state whistleblower protection law 
should have five characteristics:
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n Comprehensive coverage
The law should cover both public and private 
workers, including those in traditional employ-
ment relationships as well as those working on 
a contingent or temporary basis. The law’s defi-
nition of “employer” should include both host 
employers and staffing agencies that provide 
temporary labor. activities protected by the law 
should include filing a workers’ compensation 
claim for an occupational injury or illness, as 
well as identifying and reporting oHS issues, 
including reporting injuries and illnesses to the 
employer. oral complaints should be sufficient 
to establish coverage under the whistleblower 
protection law.
n Simplified process for exercising 
whistleblower rights 
To be covered, a whistleblower should only be 
required to demonstrate that he or she had a 
“good faith,” or sincere, belief that the compa-
ny’s actions or workplace conditions violated a 
law or regulation or were otherwise inconsistent 
with an important public policy promoted by an 
existing law or regulation.22 Workers cannot be 
expected to have a sophisticated or exhaustive 
understanding of relevant law, so they should 
have the right to be protected from retaliation 
even if the problem they reported turns out not 
to be a violation of the law. Whistleblowers 
should be granted flexibility in how they exercise 
their rights, so that they are free to report oHS 
hazards, as appropriate, to a supervisor, a gov-
ernment official, or the media.23   
n Strong safeguards against employer 
retaliation
The law should prohibit employers from taking 
any form of retaliation, including outright dis-
missal, suspension, demotion, adverse changes 
in work schedules or job tasks, reductions in 
compensation or elimination of benefits, nega-
tive reviews or documentation in the worker’s 
personnel file, or pitting worker against worker. 
To give the prohibition teeth, the law should 
create a private right of action that empowers 
workers who have been retaliated against to sue 
their employers in court. The law should allow 
workers one year (or more) to bring a claim, 
starting from the day when the worker acquired 
actual knowledge of the retaliatory action. It 
should define a successful claim as one in which 
a worker is able to establish by a “preponder-
ance of the evidence” that (1) he or she en-
gaged in a protected whistleblower action, (2) 
the employer knew about the protected whistle-
blower action, (3) the employer took some 
prohibited retaliatory action against the worker, 
and (4) the protected whistleblower action was a 
“contributing cause” of the prohibited retaliatory 
action (as opposed to a “but-for cause,” which 
makes it too easy for employers to defend pro-
hibited retaliatory actions as the result of other 
factors, unrelated to the worker’s whistleblow-
ing activity). This private right of action should 
serve as a backup to the existing administrative 
process for resolving whistleblower retaliation 
claims, whether pursued by fed-oSHa or state-
plan oHS agencies. administrative processes 
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are typically underfunded and fail to provide ef-
fective safeguards for whistleblowers who have 
experienced retaliation.
n Powerful remedies  
The court hearing the case should have the 
authority to “make whole” a worker who was 
retaliated against for exercising his or her pro-
tected whistleblower rights. The remedies avail-
able should include restoration to the worker’s 
former position with back wages plus interest, 
reinstatement of seniority or other advanced 
employment status, the reward of any other lost 
“fringe benefits” associated with his or her em-
ployment, and the removal from a worker’s per-
sonnel file of any negative reviews or documen-
tation related to a retaliatory action. The court 
should compensate workers who win their cases 
for all reasonable legal costs, and the court 
should have the authority to award punitive 
damages in cases involving particularly egre-
gious conduct by the employer. The law should 
require the relevant state agency to maintain a 
publicly available database of all successful civil 
actions brought by workers who were retaliated 
against for exercising their protected whistle-
blower rights, including the employer involved, 
a brief description of the case, and details on 
any resulting penalties or orders awarded by 
the court. The law should specifically authorize 
the judge to order preliminary reinstatement of 
a worker to his or her former position, along 
with wages and applicable benefits, if the judge 
reviewing the worker’s retaliation claim makes 
a preliminary determination that the claim is not 
frivolous.24  one of the disadvantages of relying 
on a private right of action to provide workers 
who experience retaliation with some measure 
of justice is that resolution of these claims can 
take a long time, and many workers simply 
cannot afford the delay. preliminary reinstate-
ment can go a long way toward eliminating the 
burden of delay that many whistleblowers face.
n Effective notice of whistleblower rights  
The law should require employers to clearly 
explain these rights in a language that work-
ers understand by means of a poster that is 
prominently displayed in the workplace and a 
written pamphlet to be distributed to workers 
at the time of hire and once per year thereaf-
ter. employers should be required to make the 
poster and pamphlet notifications available to 
workers employed directly by the company and 
to contingent and temporary workers.
CHALLEngES
Two important aspects of a strong whistleblower 
protection law—the right of workers to sue their 
employers in court if they experience retaliation 
and the powerful remedies available in success-
ful suits—are likely to be the most contentious. 
advocates pushing for a law that includes these 
provisions will likely face a fierce backlash from 
business groups and their political allies, par-
ticularly in more conservative states. a success-
ful campaign to enact a strong whistleblower 
protection law will likely require a lot of time 
and effort, but it has the potential to significantly 
improve oHS protections for workers.
Business groups claim that strong whistleblower 
protection laws undermine their ability to man-
age their employees effectively. They claim that 
disgruntled workers abuse the laws’ protections, 
enabling those workers to make false accusa-
tions either to antagonize their employers or to 
avoid doing work. Businesses also fear that even 
well-meaning workers will exercise their whistle-
blower rights too frequently, leading to workplace 
disruptions and decreased productivity.
To respond to these arguments, advocates can 
point out that the power to address these con-
cerns resides with the employer. Businesses can 
avoid any problems by providing their workers 
with effective notice on how the whistleblower 
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protection law works—which the law should 
instruct them to do—and by cultivating a law-
abiding spirit within the company that promotes 
the early detection and prompt correction of all 
oHS hazards. These efforts will not only pre-
serve workplace harmony; they will also benefit 
the company’s bottom line by avoiding the 
costly fines, litigation, and negative publicity that 
result when unaddressed hazards are discov-
ered during inspections or following serious 
accidents and disasters.
The law would leverage the power of state civil 
courts to screen out frivolous whistleblower 
claims. civil courts would ensure that whistle-
blowers meet the burden of proving the four 
elements of a retaliation claim, as described 
above. employers would also have the oppor-
tunity to rebut the claim by proving that they 
would have taken the same allegedly retaliatory 
action regardless of the worker’s whistleblowing 
activity.
ExAMPLES
every state has some form of whistleblower 
protection law, although they vary consider-
ably in their coverage and the safeguards they 
provide.25   
as one of the most comprehensive state whistle-
blower protection laws, New Jersey’s conscien-
tious employee protection act (cepa) provides 
a great model for activists.26 Though the law 
extends to all forms of potential workplace 
wrongdoing—including any “activity, policy 
or practice of the employer . . . that . . . is in 
violation of a law, or a rule or regulation . . . 
or [that] is fraudulent or criminal”—it has been 
used in several cases to protect workers who 
reported oHS violations. cepa has several 
strengths: public- and private-sector workers are 
covered; workers who have been the subject of 
a prohibited retaliatory action are empowered 
to sue the employer; workers have up to one 
year to initiate this lawsuit; workers need only 
show that the protected whistleblower action 
was a contributing cause of the employer’s pro-
hibited retaliatory action; workers who succeed 
in their retaliation lawsuit can obtain powerful 
remedies, including restoration to their former 
position with back wages, reinstatement of 
seniority or other advanced employment status, 
the reward of any other lost “fringe benefits,” 
and reasonable litigation costs; and, employers 
must educate workers about their whistleblower 
rights.
cepa has a few small weaknesses. Work-
ers must report wrongdoing to their employer 
first—with limited exceptions—even though 
there might be several circumstances in which 
an employee would be better off reporting to an 
outside party first. The law does not provide for 
preliminary reinstatement of workers while their 
whistleblower retaliation claims are pending in 
court. also, cepa does not provide for a public 
advocate to help workers bring their whistle-
blowing claims in court.
one difference between cepa and the law 
recommended above is that cepa employs a 
“reasonableness” standard by requiring that 
workers have a reasonable belief that the em-
ployer’s activity, policy, or practice constitutes 
a covered form of workplace wrongdoing. as 
noted above, the recommended law employs a 
“good faith” standard for workers to trigger their 
whistleblower rights, although  some advocates 
may find that cepa’s “reasonableness” standard 
fits their circumstances better. 
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workers’ Right to Refuse Dangerous work: 
empowering Workers to Demand a Safe and Healthy 
Workplace
PROBLEM
Too often, when workers encounter a danger-
ous work situation, they have a tough choice 
to make: They can either do work they know to 
be dangerous or risk losing their job. It takes a 
strong sense of job security for a worker to ask 
an employer to fix a dangerous working condi-
tion. especially in low-wage industries, areas 
with high unemployment, or worksites with a 
weak health and safety culture, workers who 
ask their employers to fix hazards often feel that 
they are putting themselves at risk of being fired 
or suffering other forms of retaliation. To make 
matters worse, workers know that any danger-
ous assignment they refuse will likely be passed 
on to a fellow worker instead.
fed-oSHa regulations provide a limited right to 
refuse dangerous work. Workers are not cov-
ered unless they have a “reasonable” belief that 
(1) the working conditions pose a real danger 
of death or serious injury, and (2) there is no 
time to get dangerous conditions fixed by call-
ing in a fed-oSHa inspector. These conditions 
are nearly impossible to satisfy, so the regula-
tions provide little meaningful protection. Very 
few states have right-to-refuse laws, and the 
laws that exist could be strengthened to ensure 
a meaningful right for workers to refuse dan-
gerous work.
SOLuTiOn
legislatures in all states—both 
state-plan and fed-oSHa states—
can adopt a law that protects 
workers’ right to refuse dangerous 
assignments or tasks until the identified hazards 
have been corrected. Ultimately, the law would 
give workers the power to compel their employ-
ers to fix dangerous conditions that could cause 
injury, illness, or death. Unions can also estab-
lish right-to-refuse procedures through collec-
tive bargaining agreements, although statewide 
protections for all workers are a more protective 
solution.
The central issue for advocates in campaigning 
for a right-to-refuse law is how to define when 
a worker is protected in exercising the right. If 
the language is too broad, then it will encoun-
ter vigorous opposition from business groups 
who will complain that the law could be too 
easily abused by workers making false or weak 
claims. If the language is too narrow, then it 
may be too difficult for workers to exercise their 
right to refuse and the law would not provide 
any meaningful protections. The two most com-
mon standards are a “good faith” standard 
and a “reasonableness” standard.27 The “good 
faith” standard is arguably easier for workers to 
satisfy than the “reasonableness” standard and 
would therefore be likely to offer greater protec-
tions to workers. 
advocates should consider pushing for a law 
that requires a worker to have a “good faith,” 
or sincere, belief that a task or assignment vio-
lates a law, standard, regulation, or “clear man-
date of public policy” (including those related to 
oHS matters), or otherwise amounts to a crimi-
nal act. This language would empower workers 
to refuse to work in many dangerous situations 
while also providing a clear legal standard that 
will help assuage employers’ concerns about 
potential abuse by disgruntled employees. 
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Some recognized occupational hazards do not 
technically violate laws, standards, regula-
tions, or policies, so a worker would not have 
a protected right to refuse work based on these 
hazards. for example, few states have clear 
standards to adequately protect workers while 
they are working in excessive heat. Without such 
a standard, a worker is left to argue that such 
conditions violate a clear mandate of public 
policy, which may be a difficult point to prove. 
Nonetheless, the suggested language is argu-
ably the broadest and most flexible language 
that is also politically viable in most states.
a strong right-to-refuse law will include other 
key elements:  
n Broad coverage
State right-to-refuse laws should cover all work-
ers. The law should cover both public- and 
private-sector workers, including contingent and 
temporary workers as well as workers in a tradi-
tional employer-employee relationship. 
n Effective notice
The law should require employers to provide 
workers with effective notification of their right to 
refuse dangerous work, exactly as provided for 
in the recommended state whistleblower protec-
tion law described above (i.e., through a promi-
nently displayed poster and written pamphlets 
distributed at the time of hire and every year). 
n A “private right of action”
The law should authorize workers to sue their 
employers in court and to seek a wide variety of 
damages if they experience retaliation for exer-
cising their right to refuse covered work tasks.
* * *
In workplaces with joint labor-management 
health and safety committees, the committees 
can play a critical role in disputes about a work-
er’s right to refuse dangerous work. for exam-
ple, ontario’s right-to-refuse law only requires 
that the worker have reason to believe that a 
particular task or assignment is dangerous and 
then relies on some kind of independent worker 
representative or an established health and 
safety committee to investigate and filter out any 
potentially invalid claims.28 This approach has 
the advantage of allowing workers to bring a 
wider range of claims to trigger their right to re-
fuse—even those that do not technically violate 
laws, standards, regulations, or policies. relying 
on a third party to help initially address workers’ 
claims would help to ensure that the law is not 
abused, which would make the proposed law 
more politically viable.
The other advantage of a right-to-refuse law 
that relies on health and safety committees for 
sifting out valid claims is that the law can also 
establish a clear process for resolving those 
claims in a way that both addresses the danger-
ous conditions and minimizes disruption of the 
workplace. for example, similar to the ontario 
law, a state right-to-refuse law could mandate 
the following process:
n internal investigation
after receiving notice from a worker about a 
hazard, the law should require the employer or 
supervisor to investigate the allegedly hazardous 
conditions in cooperation with a member of the 
health and safety committee. Based upon this in-
vestigation, if the employer agrees that a hazard 
exists, the employer must consult with the worker 
and the health and safety committee member 
on the appropriate ways to correct the situation. 
alternatively, the employer must explain why the 
conditions are not actually hazardous.
n External review
If the reporting worker does not accept the 
employer’s explanation that the workplace 
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conditions do not pose a hazard, or if the report-
ing worker does not agree that the employer’s 
actions to fix the hazard are adequate, then he or 
she should report the situation to the appropriate 
oHS agency. In state-plan states, the law should 
require the state-plan oHS agency official to con-
sult with both the reporting worker and the health 
and safety committee involved as part of the 
investigation. The worker may continue to refuse 
the dangerous work task until the government 
inspector has determined that conditions are safe 
following an investigation of the situation.
n Documentation
The law should require the employer to keep 
a written record of the event, explain how any 
reported oHS concerns were addressed, and 
provide a copy to the worker who brought the 
hazard to the employer’s attention.
n Maintenance of benefits
The law should specifically require the employer 
to maintain the reporting worker’s normal 
compensation rate at all times while the worker 
is exercising his or her right to refuse danger-
ous work. The employer may give the worker an 
alternative work assignment while the situation 
is being resolved.
n information sharing
Whenever a worker exercises his or her right to 
refuse a dangerous work task, the law should 
require the employer to inform any other work-
ers of the reported dangerous conditions before 
assigning that task to them. The law should 
authorize the other workers to independently 
assert their own right to refuse the task on the 
basis of the reported dangerous conditions.
CHALLEngES
Business groups will likely charge that a strong 
state right-to-refuse law would undermine 
employers’ ability to effectively manage their 
workforces. Specifically, they might argue that 
the law could encourage workers to abuse the 
law’s protections in order to harass their bosses 
or shirk their assigned duties. They might also 
contend that even appropriate uses of the 
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right to refuse dangerous work could become 
a needless distraction, resulting in decreased 
productivity.
advocates can respond to these arguments in 
several ways. They can point out that the fun-
damental reason for the right-to-refuse law is 
to ensure that hazards are identified and fixed 
before harm occurs. as a result, its provisions 
could actually promote productivity for many 
businesses and eliminate costs associated with 
injuries, illnesses, and “close call” incidents. 
advocates can also explain that the procedures 
for exercising the right to refuse dangerous work 
are designed to discourage abuse and to pro-
mote a cooperative and productive relationship 
between employers and workers. Under a law 
with the characteristics described above, work-
ers would need to have a “good faith” belief 
that undertaking the task or assignment would 
violate law, standard, regulation, or policy. Ty-
ing the workers’ right to laws, regulations, or 
policies will give employers an objective tool for 
denying potentially abusive claims, and encour-
age workers to exercise this right only when it 
is appropriate. Similarly, a law that relies on an 
independent third party, such as a joint labor-
management health and safety committee, to 
screen cases will help filter out potential misuse 
of the law’s protections.
a study of ontario’s strong right-to-refuse law 
suggests that business groups’ concerns about 
abuse and disruption are misplaced. research-
ers found no evidence that workers used their 
right to refuse dangerous work to harass their 
employers, but they did find that workers made 
more frequent use of the right in workplaces 
with poor labor relations.29 These results under-
score the importance of ensuring that workers 
have a properly balanced power relationship 
with their employers, which a strong right-to-
refuse law can help to promote.
Business groups may also argue that states 
would be preempted from adopting a strong 
right-to-refuse law, because fed-oSHa regula-
tions establish a limited right to refuse danger-
ous work. This argument is relevant in states 
without fed-oSHa-approved state plans, but 
it is not a strong argument. advocates can 
respond by noting that according to the U.S. 
Supreme court, only federal “health and safety 
standards” preempt state laws covering similar 
issues (see the How to Use this Manual sec-
tion, above). advocates can make the case that 
fed-oSHa’s right-to-refuse regulation is not 
a “health and safety standard” as that term is 
defined in the oSH act because it is not aimed 
at correcting a particular hazard or risk. Thus, 
states without fed-oSHa-approved state plans, 
like their state-plan neighbors, can adopt strong 
right-to-refuse laws.
ExAMPLES
New Jersey’s conscientious employee protec-
tion act (cepa) provides a good model for 
advocates that want to campaign for a strong 
right-to-refuse law that does not rely on health 
and safety committees. pushing for a law that 
establishes health and safety committees may 
be politically impossible in some states, so ad-
vocates may prefer to push for a right-to-refuse 
law based on cepa, which can provide effective 
protections for workers on its own. alternatively, 
advocates may prefer to campaign for a right-
to-refuse law based on ontario’s. The disad-
vantage of this approach is that, in states that 
do not require health and safety committees, 
advocates would have to push for a strong law 
on health and safety committees, along the lines 
described above, first or simultaneously with 
their efforts to push for a strong right-to-refuse 
law. advocates may find this extra challenge to 
be worth the effort, since an ontario-like right-
to-refuse law would arguably provide broader 
protections for workers, and it could include 
provisions that clearly establish the process for 
workers to exercise their right to refuse danger-
ous work, as explained above.    
Chapter 1: empowering Workers 27
Citizen Suits: empowering Workers to Sue  
employers over Hazards
PROBLEM
Unlike federal environmental laws, many of 
which have so-called “citizen suit” provisions, 
the nation’s oHS laws do not allow workers to 
sue their employers in court for failing to com-
ply with health and safety standards.30 oHS 
agencies’ resource constraints are the root of 
the problem, but a budgetary fix is unlikely. 
With approximately 9 million worksites in the 
United States and new health and safety chal-
lenges arising constantly, oHS agencies simply 
do not employ enough inspectors to keep a 
close watch on employers’ compliance. fed-
oSHa employs approximately 1,000 inspectors 
and supervisors.31 State-plan states add per-
haps 1,200 more inspectors to the total. With a 
combined inspection workforce that is rivalled in 
number by some suburban high schools, it is no 
wonder that major workplace disasters are of-
ten followed by media reports that the employer 
had rarely, if ever, seen an oHS inspector.32   
afl-cIo calculates that it would take fed-
oSHa and state-plan oHS agencies any-
where from 30 to nearly 300 years to inspect 
every worksite in the United States, based on 
the number of worksite in each state and the 
number of inspections that the state’s inspec-
tors typically conduct in a year.33 at that rate, the 
average worker might as well assume that she 
will never see an oHS inspector. So what is she 
to do when her employer fails to comply with 
the basic rules set out by state or federal oHS 
standards?  To take preventative action before 
she or a co-worker is injured, the best course 
of action is to file a complaint with an oHS 
agency.34 If the complaint alleges an oHS viola-
tion with sufficient specificity, the agency will 
dispatch an inspector to the worksite to investi-
gate. But even here, agency resources constrain 
responses. fed-oSHa has adopted a policy 
stating that these inspections will only focus on 
the alleged hazard and whatever clearly visible 
other hazards an inspector comes across in the 
course of investigating the complaint. It is rare 
that an inspection instigated by a complaint will 
result in a “wall to wall” approach and identify 
hazards that are not immediately visible. 
 SOLuTiOn
State legislatures can empower 
workers by giving them the power 
to file lawsuits demanding com-
pliance with oHS laws, similar 
to the right to file citizen suits on violations of 
environmental laws. State and federal environ-
mental agencies face an imbalance between 
their enforcement resources and the size of the 
regulated community that’s comparable to oHS 
agencies’ shortfalls. The solution in the environ-
mental arena, as it should be in the oHS con-
text, was to give concerned citizens the power 
to enforce environmental laws.  “citizen suit” 
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provisions in certain statutes essentially deputize 
the entire U.S. population to help enforce the law. 
legislators in state-plan states could enact legis-
lation that incorporates the citizen suit into their 
state-law programs. The basic contours of the 
statute could parallel existing environmental citi-
zen suit provisions, giving any person the power 
to file suit against any other person or entity that 
violates oHS laws. This “private right of action” 
would be available after the person who intends 
to file the lawsuit has provided the employer 
and the state-plan oHS agency a “notice of 
intent to sue” that identifies the alleged viola-
tions. Upon receipt of the notice, the state-plan 
oHS agency should treat it as it would a formal 
complaint. The notice gives the employer an 
opportunity to correct the problem or—if it fails 
to do so—gives the state-plan oHS agency the 
opportunity to open an investigation and issue 
citations. The purpose of requiring potential citi-
zen suit plaintiffs to file a notice of intent to sue 
is to reduce burdens on the court system. 
In complex environmental cases, companies 
faced with a potential citizen suit often urge 
the environmental agency to file a suit to fore-
stall the citizen suit, on the assumption that the 
agency might settle the case on terms more fa-
vorable to them than the private lawsuit would. 
The same could be expected of employers faced 
with a potential oHS citizen suit. To prevent 
sweetheart deals that leave workers at risk, oHS 
citizen suit laws should clarify that a person who 
files a notice of intent to sue will be presump-
tively included in the inspection as a worker 
representative and will be allowed to partici-
pate in settlement negotiations and intervene in 
litigation if the employer contests any citation or 
abatement order.
courts that hear environmental citizen suits have 
struggled with the issue of “standing,” a consti-
tutional constraint on courts’ authority to hear 
particular cases that is intended to ensure that 
only parties with a legitimate interest in the out-
come of a lawsuit can initiate it. any legislature 
that adopts an oHS citizen suit statute should 
clarify that the intended beneficiaries who have 
standing to sue include not only workers who 
fit longstanding definitions of “employees,” but 
also independent contractors and temporary 
workers supplied by staffing firms. legislatures 
should also grant standing to third-party repre-
sentatives such as unions, worker centers, and 
other community-based organizations with close 
ties to workers.
a final important piece of the puzzle is to ensure 
that workers and their representatives can afford 
to bring these suits. In other lawsuits, judges 
and juries can require those who lose the case 
to pay large sums of money in damages, which 
can be used to pay for the winning side’s legal 
costs. These damages would not be available 
in citizen suits, but the plaintiffs need a way to 
recoup the costs of bringing a case. a state law 
allowing oHS citizen suits should include a pro-
vision that awards reasonable attorney’s fees to 
individuals or organizations that initiate success-
ful citizen suits or citizen suit-based inspections. 
That provision could be modeled on the federal 
equal access to Justice act, which ensures that a 
party that is successful in certain kinds of litiga-
tion, including many citizen suits, can recoup 
reasonable costs of bringing the case in federal 
court. 
CHALLEngES
empowering the public to bring citizen suits to 
enforce oHS laws would be such a revolution-
ary change to the way those laws are enforced 
and to the power relationship between workers 
and employers that advocates can expect fierce 
opposition to any campaign aimed at winning 
a citizen suit law at the state level. advocates 
have mounted such campaigns in the past and 
failed—indeed, citizen suits were part of the 
debate in the lead-up to passage of the oSH 
act in 1970. a state-level campaign to establish 
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oHS citizen suits may be worth pursuing be-
cause it offers a good narrative about the need 
to empower workers as a solution to problems 
arising from government austerity measures. 
The employer community’s main arguments op-
posing the oHS citizen suit idea will likely center 
on courts’ crowded dockets. State legislators 
often work to cut down on the number of law-
suits filed by private plaintiffs, so making every 
worker a potential litigant, without requiring 
evidence of physical harm, may be contrary to 
their goals of reducing litigation. But advocates 
could counter by explaining the plaintiffs’ incen-
tives in citizen suits do not encourage excessive 
litigation. The remedies will often be injunc-
tive—that is, a judge will require an employer to 
take or stop a particular action—so no lawyers 
will be winning huge pay days and this new 
field of law is unlikely to attract the attention 
of attorneys looking to pad their purses. Many 
cases will settle out of court since the standards 
at issue have been enforced by government 
agencies for years and few questions about 
applicability and enforceability remain. The 
proposed requirement of a notice of intent to 
sue will also ensure that most cases are resolved 
administratively.
for workers, the biggest challenge with citizen 
suits will be dealing with retaliation. as noted 
above, the anti-retaliation provisions in state 
and federal whistleblower laws are inconsistent 
and rarely give workers sufficient protection. 
Workers need assurances that filing or provid-
ing support in a citizen suit will not endanger 
their prospects for continued or future employ-
ment. a strong whistleblower protection law 
would be an essential companion to a citizen 
suit law to enforce oHS standards.
ExAMPLES
The federal clean air act (caa) and clean Wa-
ter act (cWa) provide the best examples of how 
a citizen suit provision can strengthen a public 
health statute.35 like oHS agencies, the environ-
mental protection agency and its state agency 
partners have resource constraints that make 
it difficult to monitor the thousands of permits 
issued to businesses that pollute air and water. 
environmental advocacy groups, however, have 
used the citizen suit provisions in the caa and 
cWa to enforce the pollution limits set out in 
permits. 
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chapter 2: Making Sure  
Crime Doesn’t Pay
fed-oSHa and its state-plan partners spend a majority of their resources on enforcement activities. In a typi-
cal year, they will conduct roughly 100,000 
worksite inspections, and inspectors find 
serious hazards in a majority of cases. The 
consequences for employers who put work-
ers in harm’s way need to fit the gravity of 
the situation. Too often, employers get away 
with what amounts to little more than a slap 
on the wrist for sending workers into un-
safe trenches or oxygen-depleted confined 
spaces, or for using old machinery without 
proper guards for protecting against unex-
pected start-ups. Significant fines and the 
threat of extended time in prison would serve 
two functions: penalizing employers who are 
caught endangering workers, and deterring 
other employers from making similar bad 
choices about worker protections.
In this section, we suggest ways to strengthen 
the penalties that can be imposed on em-
ployers who violate oHS laws and describe 
a change to administrative procedures that 
would ensure employers start fixing dan-
gerous conditions as soon as oHS agency 
inspectors issue citations. We conclude the 
section with a list of government databases 
that workers and their advocates can use 
to target employers or local industries that 
deserve shaming for their failure to provide 
safe and healthy workplaces.
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Fix it First: closing the loophole that allows employers 
to avoid fixing Health and Safety Hazards
PROBLEM
In all but two states, when an employer receives 
a citation for failing to comply with oHS laws, 
the agency that uncovered the violation lacks 
authority to force the employer to fix the prob-
lem immediately unless workers face an im-
minent danger, a shortcoming in the law that 
leaves workers exposed to dangerous condi-
tions. experts often refer to this as the “abate-
ment during appeals” problem. When oHS 
agencies issue citations, the law requires that 
they include an abatement order that sets a 
reasonable date by which the employer must fix 
the cited problem. But because of a loophole 
in the oSH act and most state laws, the em-
ployer can avoid fixing the problem by simply 
filing an appeal of the citation or the proposed 
abatement date. The appeals process can last 
months or even years, and the longer it takes, 
the more likely it is that the unfixed problem will 
lead to injury or death. In 2009, for example, a 
construction worker died after falling through an 
improperly guarded floor hole at a connecticut 
casino. While the company was contesting fed-
oSHa’s citation, another worker fell through 
a similarly improperly guarded hole and was 
permanently disabled. according to fed-oSHa, 
there were 33 contested cases between 1999 
and 2009 in which another worker died at the 
same worksite while the employers fought the 
citation.36
agencies that want the most serious hazards to 
be fixed right away are forced to bargain with 
employers, quickly settling for sharply reduced 
penalties in exchange for faster abatement.37 
The case against Tesoro corporation following 
a comprehensive inspection of its anacortes, 
Washington oil refinery provides a striking 
example. In 2008, before Washington enacted 
a law that closed the loophole, the state-plan 
oHS agency found 17 violations, many of 
which implicated poor management of “process 
safety,” involving highly hazardous chemicals 
that have the potential to cause a catastrophic 
incident. When Tesoro challenged the citations, 
the agency ended up reducing the proposed 
penalty from $85,700 to $12,250 and with-
drawing 14 of the cited violations in order to 
persuade the company to drop its appeal, fix 
the hazards, and submit to an independent 
audit.38 
This loophole is a growing problem. fed-oSHa 
enforcement data show that employers are chal-
lenging citations at an increasing rate. from 
2005 to 2008, employers appealed 11 percent 
of state and federal safety citations, and over 
the next four years, that rate doubled to 22 
percent. In 2011 alone, employers contested 
more than 33 percent of citations.39 Some indus-
tries are notorious for routinely filing appeals. 
from 2000 to 2010, oil refineries contested 53 
percent of all safety violations, and the average 
contested case took 20 months to resolve.40 In 
all these cases, the employer may forestall fixing 
the hazard until the appeal is resolved, leaving 
workers exposed to hazards that oHS agency 
officials have determined violate the law.
SOLuTiOn
State-plan jurisdictions can ensure 
that workers are better protected 
by adopting legislation that 
requires employers to fix serious 
hazards by the deadline stated in the abatement 
order, whether or not they choose to appeal 
the underlying citation. Mandating a quick 
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fix ensures immediate protection for workers 
and puts employers and enforcement officials 
on more equal footing in settlement negotia-
tions. When employers are already required to 
fix problems right away, they cannot use their 
workers’ safety as a high-stakes bargaining 
chip to demand penalty reductions. an effec-
tive campaign would emphasize that the issue 
is about scofflaw companies that are using the 
appeals process to “game the system” at work-
ers’ expense, not employers raising legitimate 
disputes over inspection findings. closing this 
loophole in fed-oSHa states would require ac-
tion by congress.
Since employers sometimes have genuine dis-
putes about the existence of violative conditions, 
these laws should include an expedited process 
through which an employer could object to 
the abatement order. This would be a process 
separate from the normal appeals procedures 
in which the employer challenges the underly-
ing citation. The laws should address five issues 
related to the expedited process for appealing 
abatement orders:
n issues for consideration
The expedited process should give the employer 
the opportunity to raise legitimate questions 
about the reasonableness of the abatement 
deadline. It should also give the employer the 
opportunity to challenge the existence of a 
violation, since the absence of a violation would 
negate the need for abatement. Since the expe-
dited process focuses on the abatement order—
not the underlying citation—challenges to the 
characterization of a violation (serious versus 
willful, for example) and challenges to proposed 
penalties should not be addressed.
n Remedies
The expedited process will result in a limited 
remedy for the employer. If the official who 
hears the challenge agrees with the employer, 
the official should only have the authority to 
grant a stay of the abatement order. Thus, the 
employer would be allowed to postpone fix-
ing the alleged hazards until its appeal of the 
underlying citation is resolved.
n The criteria for deciding the challenge
The employer should bear the burden of prov-
ing two points to obtain a stay of the abatement 
order. first, the employer must demonstrate a 
substantial likelihood of success on the con-
tested issues. In other words, the employer must 
prove that it is likely to win when it contests the 
period of abatement or existence of a viola-
tion in the actual appeal. Second, the employer 
must show that a stay would not adversely affect 
workers’ health or safety. 
n workers’ rights to participate
The law should require that employees and 
their representatives be notified and allowed to 
participate in the abatement hearing, in case 
they want to argue against a stay. The employer 
or any affected employees that were parties to 
the hearing should have the right to appeal the 
decision to grant or deny the stay.
n Timelines
The hearing should be scheduled soon after an 
employer files the motion for a stay of abate-
ment (e.g., within 15 days), and the decision 
on whether to grant the stay should be made 
quickly as well (e.g., within 15 days of the hear-
ing). Throughout this process, the period of 
time given by the oHS agency to fix the hazard 
would remain in place (i.e., the clock would 
continue to tick on the abatement order).
CHALLEngES
In 2013, california lawmakers attempted to 
close the abatement loophole and ran into 
challenges that advocates can expect to see in 
other states. one of the main arguments raised 
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by opponents of the bill was that they would be 
denied “due process” if they were required to fix 
hazards before having the opportunity to prove 
through the appeals process that cal/oSHa’s 
citation was invalid or that no violation actually 
occurred.41 
But this argument ignores all the procedural 
protections for employers that would be built 
into the new system. employers would have 
the chance to argue for a stay at a promptly 
scheduled hearing, and if it appeared that their 
arguments against the citation or the abatement 
requirement were sound, and workers wouldn’t 
be put in danger, they would likely succeed. 
even if a stay request were denied, the employer 
would still have the opportunity to appeal that 
decision to a higher reviewing body.
The california legislature ultimately passed the 
bill, but the Governor vetoed it, arguing that the 
creation of a new, separate hearing process for 
deciding stay requests would be unnecessarily 
costly and duplicative. The experiences of states 
that already require abatement during appeal, 
however, suggest that separate hearings will not 
be too burdensome or costly: In Washington, 
employers request a stay of abatement less than 
2 percent of the time, and only 10 percent of 
those cases actually go into the expedited hear-
ing process. an agency official in oregon said 
that the number of stay requests he received 
over 23 years could be “counted on one hand.” 
advocates can also note that, far from being too 
costly, an abatement law would bring the state 
more revenue, because employers would not be 
able to demand penalty reductions in exchange 
for fixing hazards promptly.
The governor of california claimed the problem 
of unabated hazards could be solved merely by 
expediting the existing appeals process and/or 
making sure that appeals of serious violations 
are put at the front of the line. But that ap-
proach would be inadequate. employers would 
continue to obtain automatic stays by filing 
appeals, which could delay the fixing of hazards 
for months even with an expedited process. Just 
as important, government promises to speed up 
the process may be unreliable. even if delays 
are reduced at first, changes in department 
budgets and staffing can result in growing back-
logs of cases.
ExAMPLES
advocates can look to a number of different 
models in designing a bill to close this loophole. 
Two pieces of federal legislation are particularly 
well developed and offer the strongest protec-
tions for workers. The protecting america’s 
Workers act (paWa, introduced in congress 
in 2009, 2011, and 2013) and the robert c. 
Byrd Mine and Workplace Safety and Health act 
(introduced in congress in 2010, 2011, 2012, 
and 2013) are two bills that would have closed 
the abatement loophole in the oSH act, thereby 
ensuring quick fixes in every state.42 These bills 
formed the basis for the solution proposed 
above. The relevant language is nearly identical 
in both bills.
Mine workers, whose health and safety is policed 
by the Mine Safety and Health administration 
(MSHa) instead of fed-oSHa, benefit from a 
statute that requires their employers to abate 
hazards by the time stated in the citation, regard-
less of any appeals.43 Under the Mine Safety and 
Health act of 1977, employers who want to chal-
lenge the citation or the deadline for fixing the 
hazard are entitled to an expedited hearing.44  
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Examples of Existing and Proposed State Laws that Require Abatement 
during Appeals
• Oregon: Since the inception of oregon oSHa in 1973, its statute has required employers 
to correct serious violations as they are appealing the citations. If they choose to challenge 
the abatement deadline, a hearing on that issue is conducted “as soon as possible.” (orS 
654.078(5)-(6))  employers complained loudly about the policy at first, but they quickly 
adapted once it was put into place. 
• Washington: In 2011, the state enacted a law requiring employers to correct hazards even 
if they choose to appeal the citations. compared to the solution proposed above, this law 
sets a more lenient standard for granting stays: Stays are granted unless the evidence sug-
gests there is a “substantial probability” of death or serious harm to workers, and if em-
ployers appeal, they can obtain a stay unless it is “more likely than not” that it would result 
in death or serious harm. also, employers who have requested stays do not have to abate 
the hazard while their requests are being considered, which could take up to 120 working 
days (almost six months) from the issuance of the citation. (rcW 49.17.140)
• California: In 2013, lawmakers passed a strong bill that blended elements of the paWa 
bill (the criteria for granting stays) and Washington’s law (allowing the state oHS agency to 
postpone the requirement to fix hazards while the employer’s request for a stay is pending), 
but, as noted above, the governor vetoed it. a similar bill has been introduced in 2014, 
giving the agency discretion to grant a stay as long as it will not adversely affect worker 
health and safety. (aB 1634, 2013-2014 reg. Sess. (cal. 2014))
• Tennessee: In february 2014, lawmakers introduced a bill that would require immediate 
fixes only for willful, repeat, and failure-to-abate violations. In all other respects, the bill 
closely follows california’s approach in 2013. (HB 2017, 108th Gen. assembly, reg. Sess. 
(Tenn. 2006))
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Expanded Civil Penalties: Making It expensive to 
endanger Workers
PROBLEM
Maximum civil penalties for oHS violations are 
far too low to effectively deter employers from 
breaking workplace health and safety laws. 
In states covered by fed-oSHa, serious viola-
tions (causing a substantial probability of death 
or serious physical harm) carry a maximum 
penalty of just $7,000, and penalties for will-
ful and repeat violations are capped at a mere 
$70,000 (with a minimum of $5,000 for willful 
violations). Such penalties offer little deterrent 
effect. Moreover, because the penalty amounts 
are not indexed for inflation and have not been 
updated since 1990, they effectively become 
lower each year (see figure 1). If the penalty 
amounts had been indexed for inflation, they 
would be 80 percent greater than what they 
are now (as of 2014). These penalty amounts, 
which are largely mirrored in the state-plan pro-
grams, are embarrassingly low, especially when 
compared to penalties for actions that threaten 
the environment or wild animals. for example, 
the epa can impose a penalty of $25,000 per 
day for some violations of the clean air act, 
and the maximum penalty for a single violation 
of the South pacific Tuna act is $350,000.
In practice, most penalties never even approach 
the meager maximum permitted under the law. 
The oSH act requires fed-oSHa to consider 
the employer’s size, good faith, and history 
of violations in determining the appropriate 
penalty amount. over the years, the “consider” 
requirement has morphed into written poli-
cies that require inspectors to apply significant 
penalty reductions based on these factors in 
virtually all cases. for example, fed-oSHa 
starts with a penalty based on the gravity of the 
violation, then routinely reduces this penalty by 
20, 40, or 60 percent for the employer’s size, 
by another 15, 25, or 35 percent if the employ-
er has documentation of an oHS management 
system, and by another 10 percent if the em-
ployer has had no citations in the last few years. 
for most violations, fed-oSHa also reduces the 
proposed penalty by 15 percent if the employer 
fixes the hazard during the inspection or within 
the next 24 hours. Significantly, agency officials 
apply these reductions before even issuing cita-
tions, so the already-reduced penalties attached 
to citations become the baseline for settlement 
negotiations between the agency and the em-
ployer. During these negotiations, penalties are 
often further reduced to a mere fraction of the 
amount originally proposed.
Between July 2007 and June 2009, 98 per-
cent of employers cited by fed-oSHa received 
penalty reductions, and the office of Inspector 
General concluded that $127 million in reduc-
tions (about one-third of the total) may have 
been inappropriately granted. 
Many state programs have an even worse 
track record. a number of states automatically 
reduce their proposed penalties just because 
the employer was “cooperative,” without any 
further justification. The average penalty for a 
serious violation under the state plans is a mere 
$1,011, compared to $1,895 in fed-oSHa 
jurisdictions; the average in South carolina 
is just $538. for repeat violations, the aver-
age state-plan penalty is $2,412, compared to 
$6,272 under fed-oSHa (both a far cry from 
the $70,000 maximum).
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SOLuTiOn: UpDaTe cIVIl peNalTy 
aMoUNTS
legislators in state-plan states 
should enact laws that strengthen 
the penalizing and deterrent ef-
fects of oHS agencies’ civil pen-
alties.45 The updated laws should address four 
issues:
n Economic “benefits” of non-
compliance
legislators should set penalties so that employ-
ers cannot simply absorb them as if they were 
merely a cost of doing business. effective deter-
rence would require that the imposed penalty 
at least recapture the amount of money that 
the employer “saved” by failing to comply, and 
take an additional chunk out of its profits—large 
enough to put it in a significantly worse position 
than employers who complied.
n Enhanced penalties for violations 
that cause or contribute to a death or 
serious bodily harm 
When an employer’s failure to abide by the law 
results in more than increasing the risk of in-
jury—when it actually results in injury or death—
enhanced penalties are appropriate. legislators 
could mandate penalty ranges of $20,000 to 
$50,000 per serious violation and $50,000 
to $250,000 per willful or repeat violation for 
violations that result in a worker’s death. Those 
ranges are appropriate for violations that lead 
to serious bodily harm as well, since whether 
workers or killed or “simply” injured is often a 
matter of chance. More ambitious ranges or 
even flat mandatory penalties without a range 
might be feasible in some states.
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Figure 1:  Maximum Penalty OSH Act Serious Violation  
Adjusted for inflation (2013 dollars)
*Note: congress amended the oSH act in 1990, increasing the maximum penalty for a serious violation from $1,000 to $7,000.
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n inflation
all federal public health agencies except fed-
oSHa update their civil penalties to account for 
inflation, making automatic adjustments based on 
the consumer price Index once every four years.46 
Just as congress should amend the law to cover 
fed-oSHa, state legislatures could adopt a simi-
lar statute to cover state-plan agencies. 
n Repeat offenders
The mandatory minimum penalty for willful vio-
lations should be extended to repeat violations, 
to ensure chronic violators receive more than 
just a slap on the wrist.
SOLuTiOn: MaNDaTory MINIMUM 
peNalTIeS for cerTaIN perSISTeNT 
HaZarDS
Some specific and deadly oHS 
violations recur with disturbing 
regularity, despite the obvious 
nature of the hazard and the 
existence of clear safety standards or well-
known methods of mitigating the hazard. These 
violations, described in detail in the box below, 
are likely to lead to injuries and fatalities by 
exposure to poison gases in a confined space, 
cave-ins of unsupported holes or trenches that 
trap the people digging them, crushing or 
suffocation in a grain storage bin or silo, and 
mangling or crushing by a machine that was 
not guarded.
States should adopt special mandatory mini-
mum penalties to deter these violations. Given 
the nature of the hazards and the obvious and 
simple prevention measures available, man-
datory minimum penalties should be set at 
three-quarters of the relevant maximum penalty 
for the violation at issue (i.e., serious, willful, 
repeat). Whether the violations are discovered 
during a routine inspection or in the aftermath 
of a fatality or serious injury, they should be 
subject to the new mandatory minimums. These 
minimums would send a clear message to em-
ployers that they will pay a substantial amount 
if they continue to disregard these well-known 
hazards.
advocates may want to consider other hazards 
that warrant mandatory minimum penalties. 
High-profile fatalities or catastrophes may pro-
voke sufficient public outrage that legislators will 
become inclined to enact mandatory minimums 
for violations like the ones that caused those 
events.
SOLuTiOn: IMproVe peNalTy 
calcUlaTIoNS aND elIMINaTe 
UNWarraNTeD reDUcTIoNS
legislators can further strengthen 
civil penalties by putting con-
straints on oHS agencies’ 
penalty-adjustment policies. as 
noted above, oHS agencies must consider an 
employer’s size, history of compliance, and 
“good faith” before proposing penalties. a law 
increasing the maximum available penalties 
may not have any real impact if state-plan oHS 
agencies continue routinely to reduce penalties 
by significant amounts for such reasons.
one approach to improving penalty calcula-
tions is to discontinue the use of reductions 
that have essentially become entitlements. 
oHS officials apply some reductions to virtually 
every citation thus undercutting any meaning-
ful incentive for employers to improve their 
safety practices. advocates could directly lobby 
their state-plan oHS agencies to stop this 
practice. However, the best way to ensure that 
these changes become permanent would be to 
convince the state legislature to prohibit such 
unwarranted reductions by law. 
The most powerful change that state-plan states 
could make would be to eliminate the require-
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Examples of Violations for which Mandatory Minimum Fines Are warranted
Confined Spaces:  confined spaces, such as manholes, cargo tanks, sewer lines, and pipes, can be especially 
dangerous places to work. These enclosed areas can often contain poisonous gases and not enough oxygen. 
employers are required to train workers who are expected to enter a confined space and provide them with a 
monitoring device to test for gases while they are inside of it. If the atmosphere in the confined space is hazardous, 
it must be ventilated or otherwise purged to ensure it is not dangerous before a worker can enter the space. When 
a worker enters a confined space, another trained individual must remain outside the confined space to keep an 
eye on the worker. confined spaces can be unpredictable, and someone needs to be able to begin appropriate 
rescue procedures if the worker inside the space shows signs of being overcome by poison gases. The employer 
must ensure that training for rescue procedures is conducted and the equipment necessary for a safe rescue is 
available. an oSHa regulation designed to save the lives of workers who have to enter confined spaces has been 
on the books since 1993. (29 cfr 1910.146)
Trenching: Working inside a deep dirt hole that is not properly secured can be deadly. If the soil caves in, a work-
er can be buried alive, or suffocate while others attempt a rescue. employers are required to take a number of 
steps before any worker is allowed to enter a trench that is more than five feet deep. When a worker is supposed 
to enter a trench, an individual designated by the employer who has received special training must examine the 
trench’s condition. It must be inspected daily, or whenever conditions change in the trench or in the surrounding 
area. Depending on the trench depth, the specially trained individual will also determine whether the trench needs 
to be made with a particular design or reinforced with special barriers to prevent a cave-in. employers are also 
required to ensure that workers have a way to safely enter and exit the trench, such as ladder or ramp. an oSHa 
regulation designed to save the lives of workers from trench collapses has been on the books since 1989. (29 
cfr 1926.650 – 1926.652)
Grain handling:  Grain silos (tall and skinny) and grain bins (round and squat) are often part of the scenery in 
farming communities. These structures can hold hundreds of thousands of bushels of corn, wheat, rice, soybeans, 
and other dried crops. When workers are required to enter them without the proper equipment and training, 
the silos and bins can be deadly. The grain can behave like quicksand, pulling a worker in to die from suffoca-
tion. employers are required to provide workers with a body harness and lifeline that is that is fastened before 
the worker enters the grain bin. another trained individual must be stationed outside the structure and must keep 
the worker in constant sight. Toxic gases can also accumulate in grain bins and silos. employers are required to 
provide the appropriate equipment to allow workers to test the air inside the bin for enough oxygen. an oSHa 
regulation designed to save the lives of workers who enter grain storage structures has been on the books since 
1987. (29 cfr 1910.272)
Safety guards: Many pieces of machinery—from saws at lumberyards and punch presses in manufacturing, to 
meat slicers, mortar mixers, and industrial garbage compactors—have guarding systems that prevent work-
ers from being struck by or caught in the equipment. Some guards create a barrier between the moving parts 
and the user, while others use light sensors, tripping devices, or other electronics to prevent the machinery from 
operating until a worker’s hands or other body parts are out of the danger zone. employers are responsible for 
ensuring that all machines and tools are equipped with effective guarding systems and that those systems are 
maintained. Machine guarding is one of the oldest safety practices put in place to protect workers’ limbs and 
lives. fed-oSHa’s standards on guarding systems date back to 1970. (oSHa 29 cfr 1910.212)
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ment that oHS agencies consider the size, his-
tory, and good-faith penalty-reduction factors. If 
it is not possible to convince a state legislature 
to establish mandatory minimum penalties for 
particular violations or to increase statutory 
maximum penalties across the board, eliminat-
ing the penalty reduction factors would ensure 
that current maximum penalties attach to all 
cited violations, effectively increasing penalties. 
as inflation has eroded the real cost of penalties 
and agency budget cuts make it less likely that 
inspection histories provide any meaningful in-
sight into a company’s oHS record, the penalty 
reduction factors have become less justifiable.
More targeted reforms may be easier to push 
through a legislature. one fix would be to 
prohibit agencies from applying the maximum 
allowed reduction for employer size when the 
employer has a history of serious violations. an-
other fix would be to eliminate reductions that 
reward the employer for doing what it should 
already be required to do—bring its opera-
tions into compliance with the law. for example, 
states could abandon reductions for “cooper-
ating” with the agency, and for quickly fixing 
hazards.47 after all, drivers cannot get a reduced 
fine on a speeding ticket by politely promising 
the officer that they will pay their ticket within 
the allowed time period and observe the speed 
limit henceforth.
an even more limited approach to improving 
penalty calculations is to ensure that all state-
plan oHS agencies have adopted the most 
recent fed-oSHa penalty-reduction policies. In 
october 2010, fed-oSHa improved its policies 
for calculating and adjusting penalties. Since 
the changes were put into effect, the average 
fed-oSHa penalty has more than doubled, 
although penalty amounts remain far below 
the statutory maximums. State legislators could 
instruct state-plan oHS agencies to adopt the 
same policies as fed-oSHa, which include:
n Higher gravity-based penalties for 
serious violations
for each violation, fed-oSHa selects a base-
line penalty from which other reductions are 
applied. known as the “gravity-based penalty,” 
it is tied to the severity of the hazard involved 
and the probability that an injury or illness will 
result. The gravity-based penalty is only set at 
the statutory maximum in limited cases where 
there is a heightened probability of injury from 
a high-severity hazard. fed-oSHa’s new pen-
alty policy increased the gravity-based penalties 
for all other serious violations. for example, the 
gravity-based penalty for the lowest-gravity seri-
ous violation is now $3,000 instead of $1,500.
n An extended look-back period for 
prior violations
limited agency resources mean that employers 
do not often see oHS inspectors, so if agencies 
consider an employer’s history over too short 
a period of time, the data will be sparse and 
misleading. fed-oSHa now looks for viola-
tions over the past five years (the old look-back 
period was three years).
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n Limited penalty reductions for 
medium-sized employers
fed-oSHa does not allow size-based penalty 
reductions for employers with more than 250 
employees. The 2010 penalty policy also limited 
reductions for employers with 26-250 employees, 
allowing no more than a 30-percent reduction.
n Serial, rather than summed, 
reductions
fed-oSHa now applies the size, history, and 
good faith reductions one after another, rather 
than summing the percentages together and 
reducing the gravity-based penalty by the total 
percentage. as a result, the cumulative effect of 
the reductions is diminished.
although fed-oSHa recommended that states 
adopt similar reforms to their penalty calcu-
lation policies, only two states (Nevada and 
Wyoming) have done so as of this writing. 
advocates should argue that the states that have 
not adopted these administrative changes do 
not have a program that is “at least as effective” 
as fed-oSHa, a requirement established by 
the oSH act.48 advocates could press this point 
and urge state policymakers to match or exceed 
fed-oSHa’s policies.
CHALLEngES
If history is any guide, the business community 
will strongly resist any effort to increase fines, 
framing the issue as one of severe government 
overreach. They will likely argue that the new 
penalty ranges and mandatory minimums will 
strain already struggling businesses, require 
them to cut jobs, and prevent economic growth. 
advocates can counter this rhetoric by focus-
ing on the high rate of workplace injuries and 
fatalities that have gone undeterred by existing 
penalties and on the massive disparity between 
outdated oSH act penalties and the much more 
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severe penalties available for environmental 
and financial violations.
Mandatory minimums for particular kinds of 
hazards are likely to be especially controversial, 
with some industries claiming to have been 
unfairly targeted for high penalties. In deciding 
which hazards are appropriate for mandatory 
minimums, advocates should select ones that 
will resonate with the public and policymakers. 
even the business community should be able 
to agree that certain kinds of violations are so 
obviously dangerous that only truly bad actors 
would allow them to occur, and that the only 
response that stands a chance of deterring bad 
actors would be the guarantee of a severe pen-
alty in every case.
advocates may also face strong opposition 
from the state agencies themselves. Most of 
the state-plan states objected when fed-oSHa 
recommended in 2010 that they adopt the 
new methods for calculating penalties. They 
disagreed with the wisdom of increasing civil 
penalties, arguing that it would lead employers 
to challenge citations and penalties much more 
frequently.49 But that argument, taken to its logi-
cal conclusion, suggests that civil penalties must 
be kept so low that employers find them virtually 
unobjectionable—not worth contesting, and by 
the same token, not high enough to deter future 
violations. avoiding lengthy legal challenges is 
no excuse for maintaining inadequate penalties. 
Instead, states should consider ways to reform 
their appeals process to prevent employers from 
wasting state resources on frivolous challenges 
and ensure that legitimate challenges are heard 
and resolved promptly.
Small business associations and oHS agencies 
may complain that even modestly increasing 
penalty amounts will adversely impact small 
employers, since large businesses are bet-
ter able to absorb even the highest amounts. 
But employers do not have a license to ignore 
worker safety standards just because they are 
“small,” and penalty amounts are so low that 
they fail to deter some small businesses from 
violating the law. a worker who may be killed 
on the job does not care if his employer is a 
small business or a fortune 500 company.
ExAMPLES
Several states have set mandatory minimum 
penalties for violations that cause or contribute 
to a worker’s death. for example, Virginia’s 
oHS program does not permit any penalty re-
ductions for such violations; instead, it automat-
ically assesses the maximum allowable penalty 
in all cases: $7,000 for a serious violation and 
$70,000 for a willful or repeat violation.50 In 
2010, the Minnesota legislature adopted a law 
that set minimum non-negotiable penalties for 
fatality cases: $25,000 for a serious violation 
and $50,000 for a willful or repeat violation.51 
Minnesota also has a mandatory minimum 
penalty of $25,000 for all willful violations by 
employers with more than 50 employees.52 
Some states already impose mandatory mini-
mum penalties for violations related to certain 
kinds of hazards. for instance, california ap-
plies a $140,000 penalty, which is not subject 
to any adjustment, for serious or willful repeat 
violations of any crane standard.53 
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Expanded Criminal Liability: Treating egregious 
Workplace Deaths, Injuries, and Violations like the 
crimes They are
PROBLEM
oHS agencies’ enforcement cases almost never 
lead to criminal charges, even though many 
cases exhibit the basic characteristics that, in 
any other setting, would be considered crimi-
nal acts. If you run down a child while driving 
drunk, you are prosecuted in a criminal court. 
The consequences should be no less severe 
when a boss sends a worker to the edge of a 
rooftop without a harness. an average of 40 
workers are killed each year after falling from 
residential roofs, despite how easily preventable 
such incidents are. fatal falls and many other 
workplace deaths are no different from the 
cases of reckless homicide or involuntary man-
slaughter that fill local courts’ dockets—the only 
distinction is that they occur on the job.
The prospect of criminal liability can have 
a uniquely powerful deterrent effect against 
employers who put their workers at risk. No 
company wants to face the stigma of criminal 
investigation and prosecution (which is often 
more damaging than the fines), and nothing 
scares individual bad actors like the thought of 
time in prison. But so far, employers have had 
little reason to worry: prosecutors seldom pursue 
criminal penalties for oHS misconduct, except 
perhaps in the most extreme cases.
Such prosecutions are so rare that the Depart-
ment of Justice, which handles criminal cases 
for the federal oHS agencies, sent shockwaves 
through the legal world when it announced it 
was opening investigations into the disasters at 
Massey’s Upper Big Branch mine and Bp’s Gulf 
spill drilling site. Both cases offered copious evi-
dence of systemic corporate dysfunction and a 
degree of callousness toward worker safety that 
all but demanded ambitious criminal charges 
against the companies and several mid-level 
managers. But it remains to be seen whether 
prosecutors will be able to pursue indictments 
against the high-level managers and executives 
who drove their companies to catastrophe, since 
the dearth of previous criminal cases under the 
federal oHS statutes leaves many legal issues 
unclear. The fact that it takes this kind of mas-
sive tragedy to pique the Justice Department’s 
interest in prosecuting employers following 
worker deaths underscores the various legal 
obstacles that make it difficult to pursue criminal 
penalties:
n High bar to filing charges
Under the oSH act and most state plans, pros-
ecutors may only file criminal charges for viola-
tions classified as “willful,” and only in cases 
in which the willful violation led to a worker’s 
death. a willful classification requires prosecu-
tors to produce a great deal of evidence to show 
that the employer acted either with intentional 
disregard of the requirements of the law or with 
plain indifference to employee safety. 
n inadequate prison terms and fines
The oSH act and most state-plan oHS laws 
only allow judges and juries to impose a maxi-
mum prison term of just six months for a first 
conviction, or one year for additional convic-
tions. In most state-plan states, the crimes are 
deemed misdemeanors, with felony convictions 
barred by the law. In addition, the maximum 
fines available under state-plan oHS laws are 
often trivial and out of date. In 1984, congress 
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standardized oSH act fines to be in line with 
penalties for other federal offenses, resulting in 
maximum fines of up to $250,000 for individu-
als and $500,000 for organizations.54 But many 
state-plan oHS laws still reflect the original lim-
its specified in the 1970 oSH act: $10,000 for 
a first conviction and $20,000 for subsequent 
ones.
n Legal hurdles to prosecuting 
corporations for manslaughter
a criminal prosecution for manslaughter (the 
unintentional killing of a person resulting from 
recklessness or criminal negligence) carries the 
moral condemnation of the community and can 
permanently damage a company’s reputation 
and financial standing, all of which offer ad-
ditional deterrence value. often, when a worker 
dies on the job, the corporation itself deserves 
to be criminally prosecuted for manslaugh-
ter, apart from any charges brought against 
its individual executives or managers.55 Many 
workplace deaths are the result of underlying 
corporate policies and practices that put profit 
over protection and create conditions of unac-
ceptable risk—for example, relentless demands 
for faster and cheaper work, poor training and 
supervision, and “siloed” management struc-
tures that spread decision-making authority so 
thin among multiple actors that no one is ac-
countable. But the existing framework of crimi-
nal law makes such prosecution exceedingly 
difficult. courts in some jurisdictions are still 
hesitant to conclude that corporations can be 
held liable under manslaughter statutes. More 
importantly, restrictive ideas of legal causation 
may prevent courts from finding the necessary 
link between the corporation’s misconduct and 
the sequence of events that directly resulted in 
the death.56 corporate prosecutions tend to be 
skewed toward small businesses, where chains 
of authority are easier to identify.57 
SOLuTiOn: expaND THe Scope of 
crIMINal lIaBIlITy aND SeT STeeper 
peNalTIeS
State legislatures in state-plan 
states should update their oHS 
laws to strengthen criminal sanc-
tions in three ways. first, criminal 
penalties should be available to prosecutors not 
only for hard-to-prove willful violations in fatal-
ity cases, but also for knowing and negligent 
violations in cases where the violation has the 
potential to cause death or serious injury. Most 
oSH act violations classified as “serious” would 
be eligible for criminal prosecution under the 
knowing-or-negligent standard. To establish a 
serious violation of the law, fed-oSHa bears 
the burden of proving that an employer either 
knew or could have known, with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of the physical circum-
stances that violate the act. This standard tracks 
the well-established concept of negligence in 
criminal law, which requires prosecutors to show 
that the defendant failed to take the level of 
care that a reasonably prudent person would 
take in the same circumstances. Second, the 
strongest criminal penalties should be available 
not just when the violation causes a death, but 
also when it causes serious bodily harm. Such 
misconduct should be deemed a felony, not a 
misdemeanor, to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense. Third, the maximum prison terms and 
criminal fines available for oHS violations must 
be substantially increased to effectively deter 
bad actors and send prosecutors the message 
that these cases are worth pursuing.
State legislators could accomplish these three 
goals by establishing a criminal penalty struc-
ture with the following elements:58 
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n Knowing or willful violations that 
cause or contribute to death or serious 
bodily harm
a felony conviction should be possible under 
these circumstances, and the maximum prison 
term should be 10 years if a worker dies or 5 
years in the case of a worker suffering serious 
bodily harm. fines should also be on the table, 
with a maximum of $250,000 per violation for 
individuals. for organizations (including cor-
porations), the maximum fines should be much 
greater:  up to $1.5 million for the first convic-
tion; between $500,000 and $2.5 million per 
violation if the organization had a previous 
conviction for a knowing or negligent violation 
that didn’t result in death or serious harm; and 
between $1 million and $3.5 million per viola-
tion if it’s the organization’s second conviction 
for the same crime in seven years.
n negligent or knowing violations with 
the potential to cause death or serious 
injury
a misdemeanor conviction should be possible 
in these cases, and the maximum prison term 
should be six months. Individuals should be 
subject to criminal fines of up to $5,000 per 
violation. organizations should be liable for 
criminal fines of up to $10,000 per violation.
n Repeat violations with the potential to 
cause death or serious injury
a misdemeanor conviction should be possible 
here, and the maximum prison term should 
be one year. Individuals should be subject to 
criminal fines of up to $100,000 per violation. 
organizations should be liable for criminal fines 
of up to $200,000 per violation.
n Knowingly making false statements 
in documents submitted to an OHS 
agency, or interfering with a fatality 
investigation
a felony conviction should be possible for these 
violations, and the maximum prison term should 
be five years. Individuals should be subject to 
criminal fines of up to $250,000. organiza-
tions should be liable for criminal fines of up to 
$500,000.
Criminal Sanctions Outside the OHS world
In contrast to oHS laws’ “willful” trigger for criminal liability, many environmental statutes ex-
tend criminal liability to “knowing” violations of the law that put a person in imminent danger 
of death or serious harm. In that context, a “knowing” violation is one in which the defendant 
was aware of the facts that constitute the violation—a conscious and informed action, as op-
posed to an accident or mistake—regardless of whether the defendant knew that the action 
was actually against the law.
Maximum sentences under oHS laws pale in comparison to other laws that provide for 15-to-
30-year maximum sentences—even where no one directly lost his or her life—for mail fraud, 
counterfeiting, and violations of certain environmental protection laws. Shipping illegally-
obtained fish or plants across state lines can land someone in prison for five years—ten times 
the maximum prison term for a willful oHS violation that kills a human being. (lacey act, 16 
U.S.c. § 3373(d)(1))
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SOLuTiOn: corporaTe 
MaNSlaUGHTer laWS
State legislators in every state 
could establish a “corporate 
manslaughter law,” which would 
make it significantly easier to hold 
corporations criminally liable for the deaths of 
their workers. Governments abroad are increas-
ingly adopting such laws, and they have begun 
to receive some attention in the United States, 
as well.
While the laws vary in their design, an effective 
proposal should include at least the following 
essential elements:59 
n Definition of the offense 
liability should result whenever a corporation 
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes a 
death through the conditions that it creates or 
tolerates. one critical design choice will be how 
high up the corporate ladder the jury must look 
to find illegal conduct that can be attributed to 
the corporation. The law should focus on the 
conduct of owners and management officials 
(with responsibilities across the organization or 
within the particular business unit), but it could 
also include the conduct of supervisors, perhaps 
for a lesser-degree offense.
n Evidence 
Because corporate misconduct takes many 
forms, the law should permit consideration of 
a broad range of evidence. first, juries should 
examine the knowledge and conduct of indi-
vidual actors who had a duty to communicate 
information to others in the company. a particu-
larly innovative approach would also consider 
the “collective knowledge” of the corporation, 
to account for the diffuse nature of information 
and authority in modern corporations. Sec-
ond, prior violations of oHS regulations could 
be introduced to show the organization had 
been made aware of its dangerous conditions. 
Third, the law should explicitly allow evidence of 
“corporate culture” to be introduced—foreign 
jurisdictions have defined this term to include 
the corporation’s attitudes, policies, systems, 
and accepted practices.
n Forms of punishment 
The law should authorize not only heavy fines 
(millions of dollars per death), but also a set 
of flexible probationary orders that could be 
tailored to address fundamental deficiencies in 
the corporation’s management. courts could 
require corporations to submit to judicially 
supervised restructuring, to institute an effective 
oHS program with meaningful worker involve-
ment, or to fund independent oHS research on 
a subject related to the corporation’s miscon-
duct.
Typically, corporate manslaughter laws cover 
not only employee deaths, but also the deaths 
of consumers and members of the general 
public caused by corporations. So, advocates 
should be able to garner additional support for 
such a campaign from environmental, con-
sumer, social justice, and other public interest 
groups.
CHALLEngES
The business community is sure to argue that 
increasing criminal penalties would “over-deter” 
corporate action, chilling legitimate business 
conduct and increasing the costs of doing busi-
ness, to the point of destroying industries or 
forcing their relocation. criminal sanctions, they 
would say, impose a lasting stigma that com-
panies are unable to shake off—and excessive 
fines end up punishing people who did nothing 
wrong, including shareholders who lose the 
value of their stock, employees who might be 
laid off, and consumers who have to pay higher 
prices.
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advocates can counter these specious economic 
arguments by emphasizing that criminal penal-
ties would only apply to employers that are truly 
blameworthy—those that have clearly violated 
legal and moral boundaries. Indeed, prosecu-
tors will have to satisfy the most rigorous stan-
dard of proof (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) 
in order to obtain a conviction, which helps to 
ensure that criminal liability will be imposed 
fairly and accurately.
any resulting stigma is not an unfortunate by-
product to be avoided, but rather an intended 
consequence of criminal punishment, show-
ing society’s intense disapproval. If employers 
become overly cautious about oHS, so much 
the better—it would serve as a much-needed 
counterweight to their strong profit incentives 
to cut corners. The potential for extreme losses 
will pressure shareholders to monitor corpo-
rate practices and demand improvements, and 
consumer price increases will be limited by the 
employer’s need to remain competitive.60 
With respect to corporate manslaughter laws, 
one of the biggest challenges may come af-
ter such a law is adopted:  It will be necessary 
to ensure that prosecutors aggressively take 
advantage of the law’s new possibilities. Most 
prosecutions under corporate manslaughter 
laws in other countries still target relatively 
small companies, convictions have been rare, 
and the resulting fines are still small.61 To avoid 
those problems in the United States, workers’ 
advocates will need to push for thorough fatality 
investigations that can facilitate corporate man-
slaughter prosecutions by, for instance, encour-
aging greater scrutiny of “corporate culture” 
(see recommendations later in this manual).
ExAMPLES: BroaDer crIMINal 
lIaBIlITy aND STeeper peNalTIeS
among state-plan states, california has the 
broadest framework for criminal penalties: It 
extends misdemeanor liability to knowing and 
negligent violations of oHS standards, pro-
vides for high corporate fines, and permits up 
to four years in prison for repeat willful viola-
tions. other noteworthy state-plan states include 
arizona (also criminalizes knowing violations), 
Minnesota (permits criminal penalties for any 
willful or repeat violation, regardless of whether 
an employee died), puerto rico (permits prison 
sentences of up to four-and-a-half years for a 
second conviction), and Michigan (prison sen-
tences of up to three years for a second convic-
tion).
In 2006, an Indiana state lawmaker introduced 
a widely discussed bill that would have autho-
rized, among other things, a set of new criminal 
penalties against managers, corporate officers, 
and members of boards of directors who violate 
oHS rules—not as ambitious as the penalty 
framework proposed above, but nevertheless 
very significant. Under the bill, reckless, know-
ing, and intentional violations resulting in seri-
ous bodily injury would be misdemeanors, pun-
ishable by up to one year in prison. Violations 
resulting in death would be felonies, punishable 
by imprisonment up to three years (for reckless 
violations) or eight years (for knowing or inten-
tional violations).62 
ExAMPLES: corporaTe 
MaNSlaUGHTer laWS
The United kingdom adopted a new system in 
2007 for corporate manslaughter that shares 
many of the features discussed above, although 
several of its standards are harder to satisfy: 
Unlike the model law given above, the United 
kingdom law (1) requires a “gross breach” (con-
duct more extreme than ordinary negligence) 
and (2) requires the involvement of “senior 
management.”63 as of early 2014, prosecutors 
had obtained only five convictions under the 
law. However, use of the law may be accelerat-
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ing: corporate manslaughter cases increased 
by 40 percent from 2011 to 2012, and the last 
four convictions all occurred within the past two 
years.64 Similar reforms have recently been ad-
opted in canada and in the australian capital 
Territory.65 
The 2006 Indiana bill mentioned above would 
also have authorized charges of corporate 
manslaughter against organizations for reckless, 
knowing, and intentional violations of workplace 
oHS rules. However, it did not allow for the use 
of new kinds of evidence (such as evidence of 
corporate culture or collective knowledge), and 
it did not provide for new forms of corporate 
punishment.66 The bill has been re-introduced 
several times  (most recently in 2012) but so far 
has not made it past committee.
  
Killed on the Job: A Criminal Act
on July 28, 2010, the lives of catherine rylatt and her family changed forever. That was the 
day her nephew, alex pacas, was buried alive in a grain storage bin in rural Illinois. alex, 19, 
had taken a summer job with his friends Wyatt Whitebread, 14, chris lawton, 15, and Will 
piper, 20 at a corn storage facility run by Haasbach llc in Mt. carroll, Illinois. The boys did 
various tasks around the facility, including entering the massive grain storage bins to break 
up large chunks of rotten corn so that it could flow freely toward the mechanisms that trans-
fer corn out of the bins. The most dangerous way to do this, often called “walking down the 
grain,” involves climbing atop the grain while equipment is running and the grain is moving. 
fed-oSHa regulations prohibit walking down the grain because the practice is so dangerous. 
regulations also require employers to provide workers with special training and equipment 
before entering grain storage bins.
alex and the other boys had received just five minutes of “instruction” before beginning their 
jobs and were never informed about the safety harnesses and lifelines that sat dusty in a 
storage shed a few yards away from the scene. Not long after they began walking down the 
grain, three of the boys felt the corn give way beneath them. as Wyatt sank below the sur-
face, alex tried to save him, only to be pulled under himself. With his last breaths before the 
corn filled his lungs, alex recited the lord’s prayer and told his friends about his wish to see 
his brothers graduate high school.
fed-oSHa investigators cited Haasbach for a dozen willful violations that led directly to the 
boys’ deaths, yet the Department of Justice declined to file criminal charges. alex’s aunt, like 
many other family members who lose loved ones to workplace tragedies, was shocked to 
learn that fed-oSHa’s approach to enforcement is, in essence, “an administrative process—it 
is not about the victims.” 
Thousands of other children take on part-time farming jobs every year, working for employers 
who often treat them as if they have knowledge and maturity beyond their years. Safety is not 
always the first order of business, and enforcement agencies that fail to take strong actions 
against employers who violate the law only exacerbate the problem. “a stronger message” 
notes rylatt, “would be sent by actions from the criminal justice system.”
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Shaming Scofflaw Employers and industries:  
Using Government Data effectively
PROBLEM
convincing legislators to strengthen civil and 
criminal penalties is difficult work, and it gen-
erally requires sustained advocacy over long 
periods of time. for that reason, it is useful 
for advocates to also use short-term tactics to 
penalize employers who put workers at risk. 
Because many companies go to great lengths 
to cultivate a positive public image, the effective 
use of “shaming”—bringing attention to busi-
nesses’ acts of wrongdoing—can push compa-
nies to improve their practices and fulfill their 
legal duty to provide a safe and healthy work-
place.  public pressure through shaming is espe-
cially important because the weak enforcement 
tools available to oHS agencies have insuffi-
cient deterrent effect on their own. educating the 
public and policymakers about the worker safety 
and health records of particular companies (or 
even entire industries, such as construction or 
agriculture) can also help bring needed atten-
tion to more general worker health and safety 
problems, thus spurring needed reforms.
Information about the health and safety records 
of employers and dangerous industries can help 
advocates pressure employers to improve, and 
can strengthen campaigns for stronger worker 
protection laws. Too often, however, available 
oHS data are difficult to find, are of question-
able accuracy or reliability, or are presented in 
ways that make them difficult to use effectively. 
as a result, these data often are under-utilized 
by advocates, the media, and policymakers for 
informing and influencing policy debates to 
strengthen oHS protections.
SOLuTiOn
Workers’ advocates can enhance 
their shaming campaign ef-
forts by familiarizing themselves 
with available government data 
sources and by understanding those sources’ 
strengths and weaknesses. Statistics from the 
data sources can then help advocates convince 
policymakers, the media, and allied advocacy 
organizations to address workplace health and 
safety issues.
available oHS data sources include:
n The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
Census of Fatal Occupational injuries 
(CFOi)67   
The annual cfoI compiles a range of data on 
all fatal work-related injuries, including demo-
graphic data in aggregate form on the victims 
(e.g., the percentage of victims in each gender, 
age range, and occupational category). The 
cfoI also provides aggregate information on 
the industries involved, nature of the injuries 
(e.g., fall from height, struck by equipment, and 
asphyxiation). BlS presents some of the data in 
charts and graphs to help users identify trends 
in specific industries and occupations. Some 
of the data can be queried to allow users to 
customize reports to support their campaigns. 
BlS fails to make the companies’ and victims’ 
names available, even though the agency has 
that information, and even though it is a mat-
ter of public record. another problem is that the 
cfoI fails to include data on deaths from work-
related diseases.
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n BLS Survey of Occupational illness and 
injury (SOii)68  
The SoII attempts to provide an annual esti-
mate of injury and illness cases and rates by 
industry classification codes. The SoII data are 
not an actual count, though, since the vast ma-
jority of employers are not required to submit 
their injury and illness records to BlS or oHS 
agencies. Instead, the SoII estimate is gener-
ated by a sample of employer-provided injury 
and illness records. BlS’s annual SoII report 
provides the estimated number of cases, nature 
of the injuries (e.g., burns and amputations), 
severity (based on days of restricted duty or lost 
time), and demographics on the injured or ill 
workers (e.g., gender and age range), as well 
as injury and illnesses rates to assist with com-
parisons between industries. as with the cfoI, 
the SoII can only be used to identify industry-
wide and occupation-based trends. In addition 
to these limitations, well-conducted studies on 
the validity of SoII reveal that it undercounts 
injury and illness records by as much as 25 to 
68 percent.69 This is mainly because BlS gets its 
information from only a sample of employers, 
and relies on those employers to truthfully self-
report on the injuries their workers experience.
n Fed-OSHA Reports of Fatalities and 
Catastrophes70   
During the obama administration, fed-oSHa 
began posting on its website initial reports of fa-
talities in which oHS agencies intend to conduct 
post-fatality inspections. The weekly reports (and 
annual summaries) give the date of the incident, 
name of the employer, location of the incident 
(city and state), and nature of the fatal injury. as 
presented on fed-oSHa’s website, the data are 
neither searchable nor sortable. Not all fatal 
work-related injuries are investigated; in fact, 
the majority are not.  even with its limitations, 
the weekly reports of fatalities and annual sum-
maries include information that advocates may 
find useful for shaming campaigns. Groups 
may want to join forces to push oHS agencies 
to disclose more complete fatality information.
n MSHA Accident Reports, “Fatalgrams,” 
investigation Reports, and 
Enforcement Data71   
Within a week of a fatal injury involving a mine 
worker, the Mine Safety and Health administra-
tion (MSHa) posts an initial report of a fatality 
on its website. The notice includes information 
about the mine site; employer and controlling 
company; and the worker’s name, age, oc-
cupation, and years of experience. Informa-
tion on other serious non-fatal and non-injury 
incidents—for example, explosions, unintended 
rock falls, and amputations—is also avail-
able on MSHa’s website. MSHa’s data retrieval 
system gives the public access to mine-specific 
data on each inspection conducted, including 
the violation cited, a hyperlink to the specific 
regulation at issue in the violation, the penalty 
assessed, and the disposition (or result) of the 
case. The system, however, is not designed to 
search records by other factors, such as the 
type or severity of the violation. Nevertheless, 
50 Winning Safer Workplaces: a Manual for State and local policy reform
the volume and specificity of the enforcement 
data made available to the public could be a 
model for other oHS agencies. even advocates 
in “non-mining” localities may find these data 
sources useful, since they cover workers at stone 
quarries, which exist in nearly every county in 
the United States.
n washington State Summary 
of workplace Fatalities and 
Hospitalizations72   
Similar to the fed-oSHa reports on fatalities 
and catastrophes, the State of Washington’s 
oHS program posts a report called “fatalities 
Summaries,” which provides basic information 
about deaths resulting from workplace injuries 
and illnesses in the state. Both the fatalities and 
the hospitalizations summaries include informa-
tion about the company involved and a general 
description of the incident. The hospitalizations 
summaries are searchable by industry and inci-
dent type. The summaries have the same gen-
eral strengths and weaknesses as the fed-oSHa 
reports. as the website warns, the summaries do 
not present a complete list of all work-related 
fatalities and hospitalizations that have occurred 
in the state, and as such these data systemati-
cally understate the extent of many of Washing-
ton’s workplace hazards.
n Tennessee work Related Fatality 
investigations73   
on its website, Tennessee oSHa provides nar-
ratives for all of the fatality investigations it has 
conducted. (The agency updates the list annu-
ally, although resource constraints have delayed 
the posting of narratives for 2013 fatalities.) 
each narrative provides a brief description 
of the incident, some basic details about the 
worker killed, and citations that Tennessee 
oSHa issued as a result of the investigation. 
Significantly, the narratives leave the employer 
unidentified. another weakness of this source is 
that the investigation records are not presented 
as a searchable database.
n wyoming Fatal Accident Alerts74 
The Wyoming Department of Workforce Services 
(DWS) posts alerts with brief summaries of on-
the-job deaths and what the agency found while 
investigating these incidents. like Tennessee 
oSHa, DWS posts incident descriptions without 
naming employers and does not have a search-
able database. In addition, it has not posted 
new items since 2012. The DWS narratives list 
“Significant factors” and “recommendations” 
that can help other employers improve work-
place safety.
n Fed-OSHA’s Severe Violator 
Enforcement Program (SVEP)75   
Beginning in 2010, fed-oSHa began to des-
ignate some particularly recalcitrant employers 
as “severe violators.” The agency’s criteria set 
a very high bar for an employer to receive the 
“severe violator” designation, such as repeat 
violations for certain standards and violations 
classified as willful. fed-oSHa posts quarterly 
the names of the companies that have been 
designated “severe violators” and any enforce-
ment actions against them.76 fed-oSHa has 
also directed state-plan states to create SVep-
like programs. To date, 17 of the 27 state-plan 
states have adopted programs identical or 
similar to fed-oSHa’s SVep. 77
n Fed-OSHA’s Occupational Safety and 
Health information System (OiS)78   
oIS is a tool that allows the public to search the 
enforcement histories of companies that have 
been subject to an oHS agency inspection. The 
search results provide information about each 
individual inspection, including the employer 
involved, the regulation violated, and any re-
sulting citations and penalties.  for inspections 
conducted by fed-oSHa, the search results also 
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provide a hyperlink for each citation to the text 
of the health or safety standard that was vio-
lated. While advocates can use the oIS records 
data for shaming scofflaw employers, they have 
important limitations. oIS does not allow users to 
search or sort key data points—such as types of 
violations or penalty amounts—and that makes 
it difficult to draw broader conclusions about 
trends in workplace hazards. It does not provide 
information on whether the company has mul-
tiple worksites or is part of a larger corporate 
entity or conglomerate. The data can also be 
unreliable if the name of the company in the 
database is even slightly different than the name 
used by the individual doing the search (e.g., 
U.S. Steel company instead of US Steel, Inc.).
n Department of Labor (DOL) 
Enforcement Database79   
The Dol enforcement Database pulls data 
from fed-oSHa and MSHa data systems, as 
well as other U.S. Department of labor enforce-
ment agencies. It is organized and presented in 
a different format than fed-oSHa’s and MSHa’s 
individual databases, and has more options to 
search and download the data. 
advocates may want to explore other data 
sources in their state—such as online business 
records databases maintained by state records 
offices—which might provide additional infor-
mation on the health and safety histories of 
individual firms.
Where appropriate, advocates should consider 
employing shaming campaigns that make ef-
fective use of oHS data. Depending on how 
they are used, these data sources can help 
illustrate the extent of inexcusable workplace 
hazards and provide concrete instances of how 
particular hazards have harmed workers. These 
sources can add persuasive force to advocates’ 
campaigns for tough enforcement actions 
against a scofflaw employer or for stronger 
worker protection laws or standards, or for 
policies that bar purchasing or contracting with 
employers that have shameful records.
CHALLEngES
Business groups have argued shaming cam-
paigns unfairly stigmatize companies and 
industries. They say the campaigns inhibit their 
ability to conduct business and, as a result, 
harm the economy. In particular, they argue 
that such campaigns improperly lead people to 
conclude that particular companies or industries 
do not adequately protect the health and safety 
of their workers, and they will insist they are not 
at fault. Many companies are quick to blame 
workers for their injuries, assert that “accidents 
happen,” and continue to do so long after the 
incident.
Without allowing the power of their messaging 
about injured workers to be undercut by de-
bating such criticisms, advocates can respond 
by pointing out that employers themselves are 
well-positioned to avoid such risks by maintain-
ing safe workplaces and by properly educating 
others about their worker health and safety 
records, if indeed their records can withstand 
scrutiny.
Separately, because of the limitations noted 
above, groups may encounter policymakers and 
reporters who don’t regard injury rates of a firm 
or industry as being particularly high. advocates 
may face challenges in explaining the limita-
tions of the data, such as its reliance on self-re-
ported injury-and-illness rates given by employ-
ers, and the fact that most workplaces never get 
a fed-oSHa inspection. Some advocates may 
find that injury or illness records might actu-
ally undercut advocacy efforts, since these data 
understate injury rates. In any event, advocates 
should refer to the limitations in available oHS 
data as part of their efforts to push oHS agen-
cies to disclose more information about worker 
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fatalities, such as the victims’ names, along 
with a link to the related inspection records and 
resulting citations. In addition, advocates can 
focus not just on the data, but on the stories un-
derlying the data—stories of individual workers 
hurt and killed on the job.
ExAMPLES
Several advocacy organizations and investiga-
tive journalists are already making effective use 
of existing oHS data sources to shame scofflaw 
employers or bring attention to particular haz-
ards in inadequately regulated industries.
for example, members of the fe y Justicia 
Worker center have been engaged in a multi-
year effort to address wage theft in the Houston, 
Texas. They recognize that some employers’ 
labor-law abuses not only involved wage and 
hour violations, but also workplace health and 
safety hazards. The worker center reviewed 
fed-oSHa’s list of “Severe Violators” and 
identified at least one company with an egre-
gious record of repeat violations that also had 
a record of wage theft. Worse still, the firm had 
a longstanding contract with the city of Hous-
ton for excavation projects and was receiving 
an average payment of $1 million per month. 
The worker center collaborated with a local 
television reporter to expose the misdeeds. The 
worker center will be using this case, along with 
others, in its efforts to get Houston to adopt a 
responsible-contractor ordinance. 
United Support & Memorial for Workplace 
fatalities (USMWf), a group of family members 
whose loved ones have suffered fatal work-
related injuries, use oHS agency data in their 
advocacy activities. fed-oSHa’s oIS database 
provides information on whether post-fatality 
inspections resulted in any violations and the 
monetary penalties assessed with them. In some 
cases, the penalties paid have been as low as 
$1,500. USMWf uses this information to shame 
oHS agencies for penalties reductions, and 
to fight, for example, for changes to raise the 
penalty maximums. 
Investigative journalists, nurses, and other 
patient-care professionals have used BlS’s SoII 
data to draw attention to the high rates of mus-
culoskeletal injuries among health care profes-
sionals. These data have aided the push for 
state-based “safe patient handling” programs 
to ensure that nurses and other health care 
professionals have the appropriate tools, pro-
cedures, and training to lift and move patients 
safely. Nine states—california,  Illinois, Mary-
land, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, rhode 
Island, Texas, and Washington—now require 
that health care facilities have comprehensive 
programs to ensure safe patient handling.80 
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chapter 3: Strengthening 
institutions
In this section, we discuss how states can institutionalize the structures and pro-cedures necessary to effectively pursue 
criminal cases against employers who violate 
oHS standards and to improve occupational 
fatality investigations. We also describe 
how government contracting procedures 
and local oversight of building codes are 
underutilized means of protecting workers. 
We conclude with a recommendation that 
state-plan states conduct independent audits 
of their oHS agencies’ work, which may 
provide advocates and state legislators with 
valuable information about how to improve 
the agencies’ functioning.
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Systematic Criminal Enforcement:  
ensuring that police and prosecutors prioritize  
Workplace Health and Safety
PROBLEM
aside from the legal hurdles and inadequate 
penalties that make it difficult to hold employers 
criminally responsible for oHS incidents (ad-
dressed above), states lack the infrastructure to 
ensure that such cases are properly pursued. 
Workplace tragedies typically fall through the 
cracks of a criminal enforcement system that is 
preoccupied with guns and drugs. at an institu-
tional level, prosecutors and law enforcement 
are not adequately engaged in the investiga-
tion of workplace fatalities and serious injuries. 
They generally lack both the training and the 
incentive to identify evidence that could suggest 
criminal wrongdoing by an employer. Instead, 
they too often view these potential crimes as 
blameless “accidents” and cede the investiga-
tion to the oHS agency.
The investigative follow-up to 23-year-old erik 
Deighton’s death exemplifies the disregard that 
law enforcement officials often show for occupa-
tional fatalities. Deighton was crushed inside a 
plastic molding machine when it cycled on while 
he was attempting to clear an obstruction. any 
number of employer failures may have contrib-
uted directly to this incident—hazardous work 
methods, a lack of safety training, or a lack of 
safeguards that guarantee the machine will not 
turn on while being serviced—many of which 
could rise to the level of criminal culpability. The 
response of local law enforcement, however, 
was sadly typical: after conducting a preliminary 
investigation and finding no evidence of a tra-
ditional “crime,” the police concluded that it fell 
under the jurisdiction of the state oHS agency. 
“We’re done with it,” said the police captain. 
“It’s an unfortunate accident.”81 
Incident investigations by agency inspectors 
typically lack the rigor and quality of a criminal 
investigation conducted by police and prosecu-
tors, in terms of gathering evidence and inter-
viewing witnesses. also, oHS agency investi-
gations tend to focus too narrowly on finding 
technical violations of regulatory standards, 
instead of examining the root causes of the 
incidents. While oHS agencies can refer a case 
to a local prosecutor (or, in fed-oSHa’s case, 
to the Department of Justice) if they think the 
office may be able to charge the employer with 
a criminal offense, referrals are rare due to the 
perceived difficulty of building a winning case 
and a lack of institutional motivation to try.
SOLuTiOn
Sporadic criminal investigations 
and occasional prosecutions are 
insufficient to deter fatalities and 
injuries. Instead, criminal investi-
gation and prosecution should be made regu-
lar components of state and local responses 
to workplace incidents and serious violations. 
achieving that will require states to institutional-
ize the structures and procedures necessary to 
pursue these cases.
first, in state-plan states, state law should 
require oHS agency inspectors to immediately 
notify local prosecutors whenever they learn of a 
workplace fatality or serious injury. Because the 
criminal penalty system suggested earlier in this 
manual would enable misdemeanor charges 
for virtually all serious violations, even where 
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no one was injured, state-plan oHS agencies 
should devise a clear set of rules for deciding 
which of these violations to refer for possible 
prosecution. perhaps agencies could focus on 
hazards that have been difficult to deter by 
other means (e.g., those that should be subject 
to mandatory-minimum civil penalties, as sug-
gested earlier in this manual), or violations that 
exposed workers to particularly grave hazards 
or made it very likely that workers would be 
harmed. However, these referrals may not have 
much of an impact if local prosecutors have 
little experience in such incidents or lack the 
institutional motivation to investigate them.
a more ambitious structural reform, in either 
fed-oSHa or state-plan jurisdictions, would be 
to establish an oHS section within the state or 
local prosecutor’s office, similar to the “en-
vironmental crimes” sections found in many 
jurisdictions. This permanent, specialized unit 
would ensure that workplace fatalities, inju-
ries, and serious violations do not get lost or 
ignored among all the other crimes considered 
by prosecutors. The attorneys and investigators 
assigned to the oHS section would, over time, 
develop expertise in these kinds of cases. The 
oHS section should be responsible for training 
law enforcement officials on how to investigate 
workplace incidents with an eye toward poten-
tial criminal prosecution.
Ideally, a deputy district attorney and an investi-
gator from the office should be on call 24 hours 
a day to respond to reports of workplace fatali-
ties or serious injuries. once at the worksite, 
they would be responsible for directing the col-
lection of all physical and testimonial evidence 
that might be useful in building a criminal case, 
in cooperation with the law enforcement officers 
on the scene. 
Because most prosecutors are likely to be found 
in major cities, advocates may wish to cam-
paign for an “oHS circuit prosecutor” program 
to ensure equally effective enforcement in 
less-populated areas. The state would provide 
funding for a small team of roaming prosecu-
tors to help crack down on workplace incidents 
and violations in rural areas, where local district 
attorneys typically lack the resources and exper-
tise to prosecute anything but standard criminal 
cases.
advocates can work with local lawmakers to 
require police departments to investigate all 
workplace fatalities as potential cases of man-
slaughter or reckless homicide, and in each 
case provide a written report to the oHS agency 
explaining whether such charges are appropri-
ate. This requirement would ensure that police 
officers no longer view such fatalities as “just 
accidents.” Work-related fatalities should not be 
viewed by law enforcement as distinct from all 
other deaths—exclusively under the jurisdiction 
of regulatory agencies—simply because they 
occur on the job.
CHALLEngES
efforts to institutionalize a strong response to 
workplace fatalities, injuries, and other serious 
violations will face a number of challenges. 
foremost among them will be social and cul-
tural issues. The notion that workplace deaths 
are merely unfortunate “accidents” is so deeply 
entrenched that many communities may bristle 
at the thought of prosecutors treating well-
regarded business owners like criminals. circuit 
prosecutors brought in from other areas may be 
dismissed as outsiders, with no understanding 
of rural or industrial life.
political pressure may also threaten these pro-
grams. If the company responsible for a fatality 
is a significant contributor to local political cam-
paigns and/or one of the area’s major employ-
ers, prosecutors may face intense pressure from 
up their chain of command to drop the case.82  
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resource constraints will also be a challenge. 
creating an oHS section in the local prosecu-
tor’s office is likely to be a tough sell when state 
and local budgets are stretched thin, so advo-
cates will need to make great efforts to raise the 
profile of workplace fatalities.
ExAMPLES
The best model for institutionalizing criminal 
enforcement is the los angeles county District 
attorney’s office, which pioneered most of the 
reforms suggested above. In 1984, it became 
the first local prosecutor’s office in the country 
to establish a section devoted to oHS-related 
crimes. The office then began educating law 
enforcement on techniques for investigating 
workplace fatalities by holding seminars and 
distributing training tapes.83
The office’s practice of conducting its own work-
place investigations led to much more frequent 
criminal charges in l.a. county—brought in 
about 10 to 20 percent of all occupational 
fatalities—than in other counties where prosecu-
tors relied on case referrals from cal/oSHa, 
california’s state-plan oHS agency.84 Utilizing 
its statutory authority, the office also filed charg-
es for a number of serious violations where the 
risk of death was particularly high, even though 
no one had been injured (e.g., an “unshored” 
18-foot-deep trench that had not collapsed).85 
Several other institutional innovations were 
also introduced in california. It is one of only a 
handful of states that require safety inspectors 
to automatically notify prosecutors of workplace 
fatalities.86 cal/oSHa includes a criminal Bu-
reau of Investigations, which is made up largely 
of former police officers. and in 2001, califor-
nia initiated a circuit prosecutor project to help 
pursue criminal charges for workplace deaths in 
rural areas. Despite bringing several trailblazing 
cases, the small project faced intense resistance 
from judges and communities and was ulti-
mately terminated.87 a separate circuit project 
for environmental crimes is still in operation and 
would serve as a useful model for worker safety 
advocates.88  
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Robust Fatality investigations: ensuring  
effective responses to Workplace Deaths
PROBLEM
Investigations of work-related fatalities by oHS 
agencies are not typically conducted with the 
depth, diligence, transparency, and family 
participation that the situations warrant. These 
problems prevent agencies from identifying the 
multiple factors that led to a fatality, holding the 
employer properly accountable, and gathering 
information that can lead to new rules to help 
prevent future incidents.
first, oHS fatality investigations often do not 
begin until many hours or even days after the 
death occurs. Under fed-oSHa regulations—
and virtually all the state plans as well—employ-
ers have up to eight hours to notify the agency 
of a work-related fatality or an incident causing 
hospitalization of three or more employees.89 In 
other words, employers have ample time to dis-
turb the “scene of the crime,” whether intention-
ally (by hiding evidence of a safety violation) or 
inadvertently (by cleaning up the area in order 
to allow work to continue). employers can use 
that time to discuss the incident with the victim’s 
co-workers, intimidate them from speaking to 
investigators, or make them doubt their own 
recollections. aside from any employer influ-
ence, witnesses may begin to forget crucial 
details if their statements are not taken immedi-
ately after the incident. 
Second, when oHS agency inspectors show up 
to a fatality scene, their focus is too narrow. The 
goal of these investigations is typically limited 
to assessing the working conditions that imme-
diately led to the fatality, with an emphasis on 
uncovering citable violations. often, a worker’s 
death is the result of practices, policies, or 
management system failures that increase oHS 
risks, a link that can only be identified through 
a comprehensive examination of the incident’s 
root causes. These failures may include in-
adequately controlled hazards like a lack of 
sufficient training, language barriers, ineffective 
maintenance of equipment, worker fatigue, or 
a culture that emphasizes speed and production 
over worker safety. The more superficial analysis 
typically conducted by oHS agencies is likely to 
lead to changes in the workplace that fail to re-
solve root causes and thus leave workers vulner-
able to future injuries and fatalities.
Third, victims’ families and other workers’ 
advocates often feel shut out by the opaque 
investigation and settlement process carried out 
by oHS agencies. In 2012, fed-oSHa issued a 
directive intended to improve communications 
with victims’ families. Under the new policy, 
fed-oSHa contacts the family early in the pro-
cess to obtain information that might be use-
ful and to explain the process and timeline for 
the investigation. fed-oSHa is then supposed 
to provide updates to the family, supply them 
with copies of citations issued to the employer, 
and explain the results once the investigation 
is closed.90 But even with this new policy, fam-
ily members still report being unable to obtain 
access to any information in fed-oSHa’s case 
file (e.g., inspector’s notes, photographs, or 
surveillance camera footage) until all litiga-
tion between the employer and the agency is 
over, which is typically not until months or years 
after the fatality occurred. and families often 
feel their voices are not being heard, especially 
when they learn—after the fact—that the agency 
and its attorneys cut a deal with the employer in 
settlement negotiations, with drastically reduced 
penalties and downgraded violations.
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SOLuTiOn: eNSUre THaT eVIDeNce 
IS preSerVeD
advocates in state-plan jurisdic-
tions should consider campaign-
ing for a law that requires quicker 
reporting of workplace deaths. 
Unions could also add such a requirement to 
collective bargaining agreements. There is no 
need for employers to be given an eight-hour 
window to make a simple phone call to the state 
agency. employers should be required to report 
a work-related fatality no later than 15 minutes 
from the time they learn about it, or would have 
learned about it with diligent inquiry. This re-
porting requirement should also be triggered by 
incidents that cause serious bodily harm to one 
or more employees, especially if such incidents 
could potentially result in criminal liability under 
the state’s law (one of the reforms we suggested 
earlier in this manual). The short timeframe will 
ensure that the agency has the best chance of 
arriving at the scene while the physical evidence 
is unchanged and the event is still fresh in wit-
nesses’ minds.
employers should be required to take all ap-
propriate measures to prevent the destruction or 
alteration of any evidence that might be useful 
in an investigation. a violation of this require-
ment should be classified as a felony, punish-
able by up to five years in prison (similar to the 
punishment for making false statements in oHS 
documents suggested earlier in this manual), to 
ensure executives and managers take it seri-
ously.
SOLuTiOn:  GIVe VIcTIMS aND 
THeIr faMIlIeS a GreaTer VoIce
as a first step, advocates in state-
plan jurisdictions should consider 
urging their state oHS agency to 
adopt fed-oSHa’s 2012 directive 
on improving communications with families, if it 
has not done so already.91  
But states should go significantly beyond that 
directive. State-plan oHS agencies should be 
required by law or regulation to give victims, 
their families, and their representatives the right 
to meet with the agency administrator to discuss 
the investigation before the agency’s decision 
to issue a citation or take no action. families 
should be informed within 24 hours of any 
notice from the employer that it is contesting a 
violation. They should be provided an oppor-
tunity to appear and make a statement in any 
proceedings before the agency’s review com-
mission. They should be notified of the date and 
time of all proceedings and receive an explana-
tion of their rights to participate in them, before 
the agency enters into an agreement to modify 
or withdraw a citation. families should have an 
opportunity to appear and make a statement 
before (or send a letter to) the parties conduct-
ing settlement negotiations. families should 
also be notified that they can designate some-
one to be their representative with respect to 
their communications with the agency and their 
exercise of these rights.
While some of these rights could potentially 
be granted in an agency policy statement or a 
regulation, cementing them in a law would be 
the most enduring long-term solution.
SOLuTiOn:  reqUIre a pUBlIc 
INqUeST INTo THe cIrcUMSTaNceS 
of Workplace DeaTHS
advocates in both fed-oSHa and 
state-plan jurisdictions should 
consider urging legislation at the 
state or local level to require an 
inquest for each workplace fatality. among the 
other benefits outlined below, inquests would 
ensure detailed investigation of the manage-
ment system failures and other “root causes” 
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that are often overlooked during fatality investi-
gations performed by oHS enforcement agen-
cies.
Historically, coroner’s inquests were routinely 
held after an individual’s sudden or unexplained 
death. The purpose of the inquest was not to 
determine anyone’s culpability for the death, or 
to assign civil or criminal liability, but rather to 
determine the causes and circumstances of the 
death. for the most part, the role of these in-
quests in the United States has been supplanted 
by modern forensic science, with many states 
converting from coroners to “medical examin-
ers.” In other countries, however, inquests are 
still common—and in some cases mandatory—
following workplace fatalities.
a public inquest would be an extremely useful 
tool for improving the quality and transparency 
of investigations into workplace fatalities, for a 
number of reasons:
n Prompt factfinding
an inquest should be held as soon as possible—
and no later than six months—after the fatal-
ity. It would produce a detailed and definitive 
account of the facts surrounding the worker’s 
death. This account could be introduced in 
subsequent civil lawsuits or criminal prosecu-
tions, not as a showing of guilt or liability but as 
a credible explanation of what happened.
n Transparency and publicity
The details of the worker’s death would be aired 
in a public forum, permitting attendance by 
the worker’s family and friends, as well as co-
workers and members of the media. attendees 
would be able to see the evidence presented, 
including inspector’s notes, photographs, and 
video footage. The publicity surrounding an 
inquest could also help bring attention to each 
worker’s individual story and the inadequacies 
of existing regulation.
n Public participation
The inquest should be presided over by a local 
magistrate or state court judge. The judge would 
ultimately decide whom to call as witnesses, after 
taking suggestions from various parties. at the in-
quest, witnesses could be questioned not only by 
the judge, but by any interested parties, including 
relatives (and representatives) of the deceased 
worker. local prosecutors, police officers, and 
agency inspectors could be called to give testi-
mony based on their observations. The evidence 
would be heard by a jury of local residents, 
which would ultimately deliver a factual account 
of the fatality.
n Comprehensive analysis of the cause
If there was a history of dangerous practices or 
“close calls” leading up to the fatality, or an at-
tempt by other workers to bring attention to haz-
ardous conditions, these facts would likely come 
out in witness testimony and become part of 
the factual account. This in-depth examination 
would help to identify root causes of workplace 
deaths and uncover dysfunctional corporate 
cultures. over time, a series of inquests would 
produce a public record of deaths in particular 
industries, allowing observers to identify trends 
and patterns.
n Recommendations on record
an inquest jury can make recommendations 
designed to prevent similar deaths in the fu-
ture, including desirable changes to laws and 
regulations. While they would be non-binding, 
these recommendations would put employers, 
lawmakers, and regulators officially on notice 
about the changes that need to be made, which 
would be increasingly difficult to ignore as inci-
dents continue to occur.
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CHALLEngES
advocates can expect varying levels of opposi-
tion to the solutions recommended above. Some 
employers may argue that, in the aftermath of 
a workplace fatality or serious injury, they have 
responsibilities that are far more pressing than 
quick reporting of the incident to a regulatory 
agency. They may claim that their immediate 
focus will be on calling and assisting emergency 
services and dealing with distraught workers. 
But those activities do not have to be done by 
the same person. an employer can assign one 
or more employees with the task of immediately 
reporting the incident, or the person who calls 
911 can also call the oHS agency. also, the 
reporting requirement is very minimal. all that 
is required is a phone call giving the name of 
the establishment, the time and location of the 
incident, the names of affected employees, and 
a brief description of what happened.92 
employers will likely oppose granting new rights 
to victims and their family members on the 
grounds that emotional victim statements may 
unduly sway agency officials and decisionmak-
ers at hearings. oHS agencies and their lawyers 
are likely to be wary of granting these rights 
as well, suggesting that they might hamper the 
agency’s flexibility and delay the timely resolu-
tion of cases. However, none of those concerns 
outweighs the family’s right to be heard in 
review commission proceedings and settlement 
negotiations. Most victims and family mem-
bers have acquired a deep understanding of 
the factors that contributed to the incident, and 
they typically have valuable ideas for improving 
worker protections that deserve to be consid-
ered. family members consistently say that it 
is too late to help their loved one and so their 
greatest motivation is to see that the penalties 
and interventions help to ensure that another 
family does not have to endure the grief that 
they have experienced.
The biggest challenge to creating a system of 
public inquests is the novelty of such a process 
in modern U.S. law. The public and policymak-
ers may have misconceptions about the purpose 
of the inquest and what it entails. States will 
likely object to an increased workload for mag-
istrates and judges. and employers will strongly 
resist the idea of being questioned by victims’ 
families and other parties in a public forum. 
advocates will have to educate lawmakers on 
the value of inquests in other countries, using 
examples of reforms they have helped to bring 
about, the increased transparency they provide, 
and the great importance placed on them by 
workers, their families, and the public.
ExAMPLES:  qUIck reporTING 
aND eVIDeNce preSerVaTIoN
The most prominent example of a quick report-
ing requirement is found in federal mine safety 
rules. Since 2006, the federal Mine Safety and 
Health act (Mine act) and Mine Safety and 
Health administration (MSHa) regulations have 
required mine operators to report to MSHa 
within 15 minutes from the time they know or 
should know that a reportable incident has 
occurred. This requirement applies not only 
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to fatalities, but other serious injury incidents, 
structural collapses, fires, and other very serious 
events and close calls.93  an employer who fails 
to meet the 15-minute deadline faces a penalty 
between $5,000 and $65,000.94 The Mine act 
also contains provisions requiring the employer 
to preserve evidence that would assist in an 
investigation.95 
ExAMPLES:  GIVING VIcTIMS aND 
THeIr faMIlIeS a GreaTer VoIce
The protecting america’s Workers act (paWa) 
bill proposed a broad set of victims’ rights 
provisions, which forms the basis for the reforms 
suggested above.96  also, MSHa already re-
quires the assignment of a family liaison in fatal 
Killed at work: Surviving Family Left in the Dark
Sherman Holmes spent nearly his entire life in and around rural Michigan’s stately forests. 
He worked in the logging industry after graduating high school in the 1970s, and when he 
moved on to a job as a bus driver and custodian for the local school system he spent his 
off hours in the woods hunting and fishing. His love for the outdoors was so strong that he 
went back to work in the logging industry after retiring from the school system. By that time, 
though, things had changed. Holmes was especially surprised by his employer’s attitude 
toward workplace safety. In the 1970s, he was issued a hardhat and wore it every day. When 
he went to work for k & k forest products in 2010, the company told him they could not af-
ford to provide him with a helmet.
on february 2, 2011, k & k sent Holmes and several other employees to fell groups of 
clumped trees before an impending storm. Under pressure to get the work done, Holmes 
and his co-workers were working quickly and close together—closer than oSHa regulations 
allow. Tragically, one of the felled trees struck Holmes in the head and killed him before an 
ambulance arrived on the scene.
Holmes’s daughter Danielle Dole recounts a stream of indignities following her father’s death 
that exemplify the problems that might be addressed by improvements to oHS agency poli-
cies. No one called Danielle or the rest of Holmes’s family; they learned that he might be in 
danger only after seeing a cryptic message on facebook:  “a Holmes was killed in the woods 
today.” frantic, they called various hospitals and the police station in search of details. No 
representative from Michigan’s state-plan oHS agency (MIoSHa) reached out to the family, 
who had to call several times to learn the status of the investigation into Holmes’s death. The 
first contact the family had with anyone who had official knowledge of the incident was a call 
from k & k’s insurance company, offering to issue them Holmes’s final paycheck. later, when 
the family went to collect a workers’ compensation payment, Danielle recalled that no one 
could look them in the eye or give them any information about Holmes’s death.
MIoSHa fined k & k forest products $1,525 for Sherman Holmes’s death. Holmes’s daugh-
ter criticizes the small penalty, noting that the tree that killed her father garnered more than 
$3,000 in profits for k & k. Dole is haunted by the way both the company and government 
officials treated her father’s death. “Workers need advocates,” she says. “We have nobody 
for us.”
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mine incidents, as required by the 2006 MINer 
act,97 and MSHa meets with the victim’s fam-
ily to explain any citations before the company 
receives them.
ExAMPLES:  pUBlIc INqUeSTS for 
Workplace faTalITIeS
In england and Wales, coroner’s inquests are 
held within six months of all workplace fatali-
ties, since they are considered unnatural or 
sudden deaths.98 and in Scotland, a unique 
form of inquest called a “fatal accident inquiry” 
is held after every workplace death—before a 
judge, with no jury. a public prosecutor presents 
evidence in the public interest, and other parties 
can be represented as well.99 
Some provinces in canada require a coroner’s 
inquest for deaths in certain industries. In New 
Brunswick, an inquest is mandatory whenever 
someone dies at a “high-risk” workplace, such 
as a woodland operation, sawmill, lumber 
processing plant, food processing plant, fish 
processing plant, construction project site, or 
mining site.100 In ontario, inquests are manda-
tory for all construction- and mining-related fa-
talities; a jury of six citizens hears the case and 
can make recommendations to any entity. The 
coroner cannot require the recommendations to 
be adopted, but recommendations made to the 
Ministry of labor are evaluated by a legislative 
committee that has the authority to adopt new 
regulations. Workers’ advocates throughout 
canada have been fighting to require inquests 
for all workplace deaths.101    
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Responsible Contractor Laws: Holding  
Government contractors accountable for Worker  
Health and Safety
PROBLEM
Without robust policies to ensure that their 
contractors have effective oHS programs, 
government agencies run the risk of subsidizing 
construction firms that operate hazardous work-
sites. agencies typically hire the lowest bidder, 
so companies that cut corners on worker health 
and safety on the assumption that it reduces 
project costs may be rewarded with lucrative 
government contracts. By failing to set a high 
standard for worker safety in their public works 
projects, state and local authorities are miss-
ing a major opportunity to reshape the market 
and incentivize safer worksites throughout the 
industry.
construction is one of the most hazardous 
industries for workers. frequent injuries and 
deaths from falls, electrocutions, and striking 
objects impose unbearably high costs on indi-
viduals, families, and local economies. public 
citizen estimates that, between 2008 and 2010, 
fatal and nonfatal construction injuries cost the 
states of Maryland $713 million, Washington 
$762 million, and california $2.9 billion in 
medical services, lost productivity, administrative 
expenses, and lost quality of life.102 
The firms responsible for many of these injuries 
and fatalities, and those with histories of cita-
tions for unsafe practices, continue to receive 
contracts from state and local governments. 
for example, by early 2013 Ser construction 
partners had been repeatedly cited for serious, 
repeat, and even willful violations of fed-oSHa 
standards for excavation and trenching, and 
yet the company was still raking in $20 million 
over a ten-month period from contracts with 
the city of Houston, not to mention a slew of 
other Texas municipalities. and in late 2013, 
after a 28-year-old worker named angel Gar-
cia died after falling four stories while working 
on a large, publicly funded renovation project 
at Texas a&M University, the company was 
found to have violated fed-oSHa’s demolition 
standards. Just six months earlier, four workers 
had been seriously injured on the same cam-
pus when a construction site collapsed; the two 
companies responsible both had extensive rap 
sheets of fed-oSHa violations before being 
hired to work on the university project.
SOLuTiOn
advocates should campaign for 
legislation that would require state 
and local agencies to consider a 
bidder’s oHS policies and perfor-
mance before awarding public contracts. Such 
laws or ordinances could be enacted in both 
state-plan and fed-oSHa states. The most ef-
fective way to implement this requirement would 
be through a prequalification process, in which 
firms are not allowed to enter bids until they 
pass a rigorous oHS evaluation. This require-
ment should apply to both general contractors 
and subcontractors seeking to work on public 
projects, to ensure that all the companies in-
volved in managing the worksite pass muster.
The benefits of such a program, including 
improved worker safety, increased productivity, 
and lower insurance costs for employers, reach 
far beyond public contracts, since companies 
hoping to remain eligible for bidding would 
have to maintain a good oHS record in all 
their work—including projects done for private 
clients.
64 Winning Safer Workplaces: a Manual for State and local policy reform
a committee of national experts has developed 
a strong model bill, included in a series of 
reports by public citizen, for state legislatures 
to use in designing a prequalification system.103 
The bill instructs the state labor department to 
develop, in consultation with stakeholders, a 
standardized questionnaire and rating system 
for evaluating potential bidders on objective 
criteria, including among other things: 
n Planning 
employers should use written, site-specific oHS 
plans.
n Leadership 
employers should demonstrate a commitment 
by management to worker health and safety.
n Training 
employers should provide effective and regu-
larly scheduled oHS training of workers and 
supervisors, in a language and format that each 
employee can understand.
n Employee participation 
employers should have policies that encourage 
workers to report unsafe conditions and work-
related injuries. They should grant workers the 
right to immediately stop working in hazardous 
conditions.
n Compliance record
The rating system considers numerous aspects 
of an employer’s compliance record, includ-
ing: fed-oSHa lost-time incident rates and 
injury-and-illness rates; workers’ compensation 
experience modification rates (eMrs, which re-
flect the number and value of a firm’s workers’ 
compensation claims, as compared to those of 
other firms in the same industry); citations and 
penalties by state and federal oHS agencies; 
and stop-work orders issued for violating oHS 
or other laws.
n Other factors 
The state labor department should consider any 
other factors it finds useful in evaluating oHS 
performance.
* * *
Building on this model bill, advocates may want 
to consider pushing for additional disclosures, 
such as: (1) records of any state or federal oHS 
agency inspections, regardless of the outcome; 
(2) copies of any settlement agreements with 
agencies; (3) decisions issued by oHS review 
commissions (or any other independent bod-
ies that hear employers’ challenges to oHS 
agency citations and penalties); and (4) records 
of “close call” incidents that could have resulted 
in worker injuries. requiring potential bidders to 
disclose five years’ worth of these items would 
provide agencies with broader context for a 
firm’s compliance history. firms should also be 
required to identify and submit any oHS poli-
cies they use that go beyond mere compliance 
with specific fed-oSHa or state-plan standards. 
also, bidders could be required to establish a 
whistleblower protection policy and to supply 
proof of workers’ compensation coverage. The 
state department of labor should set a minimum 
passing score for the questionnaire, and bidders 
should have to undergo the evaluation at least 
once a year to remain eligible.
advocates may also want to urge legislators to 
incorporate safety audits into the rating sys-
tem. Insurance carriers often provide audits at 
the employer’s request, in an effort to identify 
potential oHS violations and hazards so the 
employer can correct them before workers are 
injured and file workers’ compensation claims, 
or an oHS agency discovers them upon inspec-
tion and imposes penalties. While the informa-
tion in these audits is much more valuable than 
simple injury-and-illness statistics, requiring 
employers to submit their recent safety audits as 
part of the prequalification process could dis-
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courage employers from requesting the audits 
in the first place. Instead, contractors should be 
encouraged to submit any safety audits pre-
pared in the past five years, along with informa-
tion about any corrective actions they took in 
response. The state’s prequalification scoring 
system could give potential bidders credit both 
for submitting the audits and for any correc-
tive actions. This way, employers would have 
new incentives to monitor for hazards and to fix 
them when they are discovered.
Debarment, or prohibiting noncompliant 
companies from receiving contracts, is another 
critical issue. By creating the possibility that a 
firm would be prohibited from bidding on or re-
ceiving government contracts, state legislatures 
or local governments could establish significant 
economic incentives for firms to improve their 
health and safety programs. one justification 
for debarment is to preserve the integrity of the 
prequalification process. prospective bidders 
would have strong incentives to submit false 
records, so they should be required to attest to 
the accuracy of their responses under penalty 
of perjury. If the department discovers that a 
firm provided misleading information, the firm 
should be debarred for a substantial period of 
time (e.g., five years), meaning that it would 
be unable to bid on public contracts until the 
debarment expired. another justification for 
debarment is to penalize continued non-com-
pliance with oHS-related laws and regulations. 
Just as prequalification ensures that worker 
safety is taken into account at the front end of 
the public bid process, state and local agencies 
also need the authority to debar irresponsible 
contractors from bidding on future contracts 
based on chronic safety violations, either for a 
fixed period of time or permanently (depending 
on the severity of the violations).104 
So far, responsible contractor programs have 
focused almost exclusively on the construction 
industry, but there are many other industries, 
including health care and security, that con-
States with Existing OHS Prequalification Programs 
• California does not require agencies to adopt a prequalification system, but for those that 
choose to, the state has developed a model questionnaire with scoring guidelines. (cal. 
pub. cont. code § 20101; http://www.dir.ca.gov/od_pub/prequal/pubWksprequalModel.
pdf)
• Massachusetts requires prequalification for contractors and subcontractors bidding on 
projects costing $100,000 or more. a record of excessive safety violations or injuries found 
to qualify for workers’ compensation may be cause for taking a company off the qualified 
list. (810 cMr 9.00 et seq.)
• Connecticut requires prequalification for projects costing more than $500,000. (c.G.S. § 
4a-100)
• Tennessee requires contractors (who have already been awarded contracts by the state’s 
Department of Transportation) to certify that they have an effective employee Safety and 
Health program before work can begin. (Tennessee Department of Transportation, con-
struction Division, contractor employee Safety and Health program, http://www.tdot.state.
tn.us/construction/Safety_Health_program/employeeSafetyandHealth.pdf)
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tract with state and local agencies and whose 
workers face serious job hazards. advocates 
may want to explore ways to implement similar 
programs for these industries as well.
It may be useful to frame these contracting 
policies as a responsible use of taxpayer dol-
lars. Such a strategy might help to make the 
idea more appealing to politically conservative 
policymakers and the broader public, for whom 
issues of worker safety may not resonate as 
strongly.
CHALLEngES
Trade associations fighting against prequalifica-
tion programs say that rigorous prequalification 
is impractical. They claim that general contrac-
tors will not have time to adequately screen 
subcontractors and verify their safety records 
during the hectic bidding process, since they 
often have to accept sub-bids at the last min-
ute.105 However, if the state maintains a standing 
list of contractors and subcontractors that have 
already been prequalified, then general con-
tractors can quickly and easily select from that 
list with confidence during the bidding process. 
Massachusetts, for example, has successfully 
implemented such a database.
The shortcomings of existing measures of em-
ployer safety also present a challenge. Because 
there are too few oHS inspectors, and because 
some employers fail to report on-the-job in-
juries, inspection records and official injury 
reports may not reflect the actual incidence of 
hazards or occupational injuries and illnesses. 
employers might also argue that these oHS 
recordkeeping requirements were intended for 
monitoring industry-wide trends and writing bet-
ter rules, not for singling out firms for different 
treatment based on their numbers.
employers whose workers are represented by 
a union or other labor organization may have 
a reported injury-and-illness rate that is higher, 
or history of oHS inspections that is greater, 
than non-union competitors. Workers with union 
backing may not feel as discouraged from 
reporting injuries and may be less likely to fear 
retaliation for reporting oHS hazards or for 
contacting a government agency for unresolved 
oHS problems. for these reasons, unionized 
firms may fear that too much emphasis on these 
metrics will put them at a competitive disad-
vantage in the bidding process. labor unions 
might object as well because a firm’s inability to 
secure contracts would result in fewer jobs for 
their members.
a similar concern arises with workers’ compen-
sation eMrs, because these reflect only the inju-
ries for which workers file compensation claims. 
Many employers pressure workers into not filing 
claims for on-the-job injuries, and weighing 
this factor heavily in contracting decisions could 
result in employers increasing the pressure on 
workers to not file compensation claims.
These concerns can be addressed by designing 
a prequalification process that looks at a wide 
range of factors, not just a firm’s reported injury 
rates, eMrs, and inspection histories. These 
metrics could be components of the evaluation, 
but they would be balanced by more qualita-
tive factors, including a firm’s written safety plan 
and its programs for employee training and 
participation.
ExAMPLES
Many states have prequalification programs in 
place, although most do not address issues of 
worker safety at all, instead focusing on com-
panies’ financial health, bonding capacity, and 
previous experience. The few programs that do 
address worker safety take into account only a 
limited set of factors, such as the firm’s eMr, 
its history of citations, and its record of safety 
meetings. Moreover, these programs—with the 
exception of california’s—do not guarantee that 
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the oHS factors will be consistently and mean-
ingfully incorporated into the evaluation. 
public citizen and the National council for oc-
cupational Safety and Health (National coSH) 
have been urging state and local officials to 
consider bidders’ safety records before award-
ing public contracts. Bills closely resembling the 
model legislation described above have been 
recently introduced in Maryland,106  North caro-
lina,107 and Tennessee.108  
innovative Contracting Policies at the Local Level
• Montgomery County, MD has developed a detailed set of terms and conditions that gov-
ern oHS in construction contracts, which it recently updated to require prequalification of 
subcontractors as well.
 (http://www6.montgomerycountymd.gov/apps/News/press/pr_details.asp?prID=8703)
• Durham, NC requires bidders to answer detailed questions about their compliance re-
cords and safety plans.
 (appendix B, http://durhamnc.gov/ich/op/pwd/consproj/Documents/raincatchers/all%20
apendices.pdf)
• Fairfax County, VA evaluates bidders across a wide range of safety criteria, with false 
submissions resulting in disqualification, debarment, or contract termination.
 (http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/dpwes/construction/bids/constrsafety.pdf)
• The Los Angeles Unified School District uses a robust questionnaire that covers subjects 
from training documentation to reporting of “close call” incidents. contractors’ safety prac-
tices are also directly evaluated during the course of the work, and sometimes again upon 
completion, to provide more information for future prequalification efforts.
 (http://www.laschools.org/new-site/prequalification/forms)
• The New York City Council in 2013 introduced an ordinance that would require all con-
tractors and subcontractors applying for financial assistance on city development projects 
(1) to have apprenticeship programs, including safety training, and (2) to disclose any oHS 
violations within the past 10 years, to be posted on the city’s website. (Int. No. 1169)
• The Oakland and Fremont, CA city councils passed resolutions in early 2014 that direct 
their city managers to address wages, benefits, and oHS conditions at waste recycling 
facilities when negotiating franchise agreements.
• The Austin, TX city council adopted an ordinance in July 2010 that requires all construc-
tion projects with a city permit to provide workers a rest break of no less than 10 minutes 
for every four hours worked.
 (http://austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/contract_Management/rest_Break_ordi-
nance_posters.pdf)
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Cross-Agency Partnerships: Working across 
Government to protect Workers
PROBLEM
oHS agencies are denied the resources they 
need to inspect all, or even a significant num-
ber, of the 9 million workplaces in the United 
States. The afl-cIo calculates that it would take 
more than a century for these agencies to in-
spect every workplace at current funding levels. 
Thus, fed-oSHa and the state-plan agencies 
rely on workers and their advocates to identify 
dangerous working conditions. each year, they 
conduct tens of thousands of inspections based 
on complaints from workers or their repre-
sentatives and referrals from other agencies. 
as described above, workers who can identify 
conditions that violate oHS standards may file 
a complaint and wait for an oHS inspector to 
conduct an investigation, but many workers are 
afraid to blow the whistle on unsafe working 
conditions because they understandably fear 
their employers will retaliate against them. 
officials from other government agencies who 
observe potential oHS violations, by contrast, 
need not fear employer backlash for report-
ing the dangerous conditions to oHS agency 
officials. These referrals can be a valuable tool 
for oHS agencies, providing another source of 
reliable information about worksites that may 
need improvements.
SOLuTiOn
Various state and local govern-
ment agencies could do a better 
job of referring cases to fed-
oSHa and state-plan oHS agen-
cies for investigation. Building inspectors, fire 
marshals, and other agents who enforce local 
codes often have legislatively granted powers to 
remove people from buildings or stop work at 
construction sites when they observe conditions 
that are particularly dangerous for workers or 
members of the public. although this author-
ity arises out of the agencies’ power to enforce 
building and fire codes, the linkages to oHS 
concerns are often clear. In New york city, for 
instance, the Department of Buildings (DoB) en-
vironmental control Board enforces local codes 
dealing with excavation and demolition—haz-
ardous jobs that are carried out increasingly by 
immigrant and other vulnerable workers.
Workers’ advocates can capitalize on the stop-
work powers of state and local inspectors by 
campaigning to ensure that inspectors have a 
strong understanding of how their codes over-
lap with oHS regulations. advocates could 
campaign for training programs that would 
educate inspectors about the overlapping issues 
and ensure that the inspectors submit referrals 
to an oHS agency every time they issue a stop-
work order or code violation that directly relates 
to worker safety. 
an important facet of this approach to strength-
ening oHS protections is that it can be ac-
complished without buy-in from a legislative 
body, although legislative support would cer-
tainly strengthen the program. for instance, 
advocates could consult with oHS experts who 
could review state or local codes and develop 
a “cross-walk” document that links provisions 
of those codes to state or federal oSHa regula-
tions. That document could be the centerpiece 
of a campaign to connect various code enforce-
ment agencies with oHS agency enforcement 
staff. Importantly, many localities have adopted 
consensus standards (e.g., National fire protec-
tion association codes and standards) as their 
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local codes, creating an opportunity for a multi-
jurisdiction cross-walk document and outline for 
oHS referral procedures.
examples of major oHS hazards that might be 
covered in both building codes and oHS regu-
lations are:  demolition, excavation and trench 
digging, scaffolds, cranes, fire hazards, and 
access to fire exits. When building inspectors 
find code violations related to these hazards, 
they should immediately submit a referral to the 
state-plan oHS agency or local fed-oSHa area 
office.
Wage-and-hour officials whose primary job is 
to ensure that workers are being paid fairly are 
the other group of enforcement authorities who 
may have the opportunity to ask workers if they 
have observed conditions of concern at their 
workplaces. as a practical matter, employers 
who violate wage and hour laws are likely to 
be the same ones that violate oHS regulations. 
cal/oSHa collaborates with state agencies that 
enforce wage-and-hour laws, workers’ compen-
sation requirements, contracting, licensing, and 
other work-related programs.109 This california 
labor enforcement Task force investigates work-
er complaints and has developed an innovative 
inspection-targeting program that combines 
the agencies’ staff, knowledge, and authori-
ties. a firm with health and safety problems that 
might not rise to the level of “imminent danger” 
required for a cal/oSHa stop-work order might 
nonetheless be ordered to shut down if suffi-
cient wage-and-hour or workers’ compensation 
violations are also uncovered by the task force 
during a joint inspection. 
CHALLEngES
Major budgetary constraints and overworked 
staff are problems in almost every government 
agency. proposals that would add oHS-related 
responsibilities on top of code inspectors’ exist-
ing workloads may not garner sufficient support 
from code inspectors to be workable. certainly 
if oHS advocates go to the state legislature in 
hopes of securing a legal mandate to develop 
partnerships between code enforcers and oHS 
agencies, a lack of support from the code 
enforcers could doom the proposal. Work-
ers’ advocates must develop the evidence that 
improving linkages between stop-work authority 
and oHS standards is a low-cost, high-impact 
concept. on the cost side of the equation, 
advocates can explain that the burden on code 
inspectors would be as minimal and easy as 
a phone call to the state-plan oHS agency or 
local fed-oSHa area office. Some referrals—
including unsafe excavations, rickety scaffold-
ing, and blocked fire exits—are problems that 
should obviously be referred to oHS agencies. 
With improved education and training, some 
less obvious hazardous conditions, such as 
improperly stored chemicals or inadequate pro-
tection for employees working at heights, could 
lead to referrals that will keep workers safe. 
Workers’ advocates could further strengthen 
their case by compiling statistics comparing the 
number of building code inspections in a local-
ity with the number of planned inspections by 
the relevant oHS agency.110 
The issue of preemption will inevitably arise 
when advocates begin discussing how regula-
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tions other than those adopted by fed-oSHa 
might be used to protect workers in fed-oSHa’s 
jurisdiction. The recommendation laid out 
above, though, is simply that government of-
ficials who enforce other laws and regulations 
should refer more cases to fed-oSHa when 
violations of their regulations correspond to po-
tential violations of oHS regulations. The other 
officials’ laws and regulations are, by definition, 
the laws of general applicability that are not 
preempted by the oSH act (see a Brief explana-
tion of preemption, above).
ExAMPLES
New york city’s Department of Buildings (DoB) 
is a prime example of a local code enforcement 
agency that issues stop-work orders for oHS-re-
lated violations. The department has numerous 
code provisions that relate directly to workers’ 
health and safety, including requirements re-
lated to cranes, hoisting equipment, scaffolding, 
demolition, and excavation. Many are simple 
notice or permitting requirements that man-
date, for instance, that firms obtain a permit 
and notify neighbors before excavating below 
certain depths. Stop-work orders can be issued 
for failure to meet those obligations. Scofflaw 
employers who neglect to follow these building 
codes might very well take the same cavalier at-
titude towards oHS requirements, so it is critical 
that building inspectors refer such cases to oHS 
enforcement officials.   
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Annual State-Level Audits: Grading agency 
performance
PROBLEM
Workers in every state experience injuries, ill-
nesses, and fatalities due to workplace hazards, 
but without adequate information on what the 
state-plan oHS agencies are doing or not doing 
to address those problems, it will be difficult for 
advocates to pinpoint exactly what changes these 
agencies need to make to better protect workers.
fed-oSHa evaluates the performance of the 
state-plan oHS agencies in its federal annual 
Monitoring and evaluation (faMe) audits to de-
termine whether they are “at least as effective” as 
fed-oSHa—the minimum legal standard that de-
termines whether states can continue to run their 
own oHS programs. The evaluations focus mainly 
on a set of quantitative measures that states are 
required to track, from average penalty amounts 
to the promptness of agency activities. 
fed-oSHa’s reports, while valuable, cover only 
certain aspects of agency performance. advocates 
will need more information about their state-plan 
oHS agency’s practices in order to identify prob-
lems and pursue much-needed reforms.
SOLuTiOn
legislatures in state-plan jurisdic-
tions should create a system for 
conducting annual performance 
audits of the state’s oHS agency. 
a legislative oversight committee, for example, or 
an independent commission with worker mem-
bers could be the entity responsible for conduct-
ing these audits, preparing detailed reports, and 
posting them online. The oversight body would 
develop qualitative and quantitative measures to 
evaluate the agency’s performance, prepare a 
detailed report, and post it online. The oversight 
body’s purpose would be broader than fed-
oSHa’s: Instead of simply determining whether 
the state program meets the (fairly low) bar set 
by fed-oSHa, the committee would focus on 
maximizing the program’s effectiveness, ideally to 
a point that far surpasses the performance of fed-
oSHa and other states.
State-level audits could be useful in persuading 
lawmakers and the public of the need for reforms, 
including many of those suggested in this manual. 
also, once a state adopts any of these reforms, the 
oversight body could be responsible for monitor-
ing implementation.
The following are just a few examples of the topics 
and metrics that could be examined by the over-
sight body:
• What are the mean and median number of 
days or hours for the agency to respond to 
complaints, fatalities, and imminent danger 
situations? 
• What are the average initial penalties and aver-
age “final” penalties for each citation category 
(serious, willful, repeat, etc.)?
• What percentage of serious hazards is corrected 
during the inspection? 
• How effective is the agency’s outreach to indus-
try about particular hazards (e.g., fall protection 
on construction sites) in reducing the number of 
fatalities and injuries related to the hazard?
• In what percentage of inspections do union 
representatives participate with the oHS agency 
staff?
• In what percentage of inspections do represen-
tatives from community-based organizations 
participate with the oHS agency staff? 
• What are the language abilities of the oHS 
agency inspectors? 
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• Has the agency taken proactive steps to encour-
age second-language ability among its staff 
(e.g., recruiting inspectors with second-lan-
guage skills; paying for tuition, books, and time 
off when workers take language classes)?
• What percentage of the agency’s citations are 
overturned or have the penalty reduced on ap-
peal?
• Is the agency adequately preserving its enforce-
ment records and making enough informa-
tion publicly available to enable workers and 
advocates to monitor the agency’s progress and 
identify areas for improvement?
CHALLEngES
lawmakers and agencies may object to the over-
lap between the state-level audits and fed-oSHa’s 
faMe evaluations, claiming that the state audit 
would entail an unnecessary duplication of effort. 
advocates can point out that fed-oSHa’s evalu-
ation criteria set a low bar for performance. State 
officials should want their program to be more 
effective than fed-oSHa.
State-plan oHS agency staff may be concerned 
that the metrics are unfair because they don’t take 
into consideration their inadequate funding. advo-
cates can respond by indicating that the oversight 
body’s report has the potential to provide evi-
dence that the agency needs additional resources.
a major source of tension in designing an audit 
plan will be developing the evaluation metrics. 
Some groups are likely to prefer outcome-based 
measures, designed to reflect the impact of agency 
performance on workplace safety (e.g., injury and 
fatality rates). others may prefer activity-based 
measures, which focus on the agency’s practices 
and procedures (e.g., the number of inspec-
tions conducted). Both types have strengths and 
weaknesses, and advocates could argue for a 
combination of both. also, audits should consider 
quantitative measures (e.g., the percentage of 
inspections with violations), as well as qualitative 
measures (e.g., interviews with workers or their 
representatives on the agency’s effectiveness) to 
obtain a more comprehensive picture of agency 
performance.
State-plan oHS agencies may feel that activity-
based metrics invite too much scrutiny of specific 
agency practices, leading to micromanagement 
by the oversight committee and depriving the 
agency of flexibility and discretion in how it oper-
ates its program.111 and employers are likely to be 
wary of any audit program that might influence 
agencies to step up their enforcement practices.
advocates should also be aware of any unintend-
ed consequences that may result from agencies 
attempting to satisfy the audit measures. for ex-
ample, if an agency is judged only on the number 
of inspections performed, it might begin to con-
duct a greater number of relatively simple “safety” 
inspections while neglecting to conduct more 
complex “health” inspections. To avoid these kinds 
of unintended consequences, advocates could 
emphasize the need for an independent body with 
worker representation that would be responsible 
for developing the auditing program.
ExAMPLES
State legislative audits of agency performance 
are common, and indeed, many state legislatures 
have offices that specialize in conducting these 
audits on behalf of standing oversight committees. 
In Maryland, for example, the office of legislative 
audits (located within the Department of legisla-
tive Services) undertakes performance audits of 
state agencies at the request of the legislature’s 
Joint audit committee. on some occasions, the 
legislature may even request outside watchdog 
groups or research organizations to conduct an 
audit.112 
fed-oSHa’s faMe reports offer a good starting 
point for what these audits could look like, but as 
suggested above, advocates should encourage a 
much broader investigation into agency perfor-
mance.113  
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conclusion
activists, organizers, and other work-ers’ advocates operating at the state and local level will usher in the next 
generation of oHS policies. Because of 
resistance in Washington to worker protec-
tions, forward-looking Members of con-
gress and progressive officials at fed-oSHa 
often get mired in political fights when they 
seek to enact changes to federal oHS laws 
and policies so as to better protect workers. 
Their counterparts in state legislatures, city 
councils, and state-plan oHS agencies also 
face opposition from moneyed interests, but 
grassroots organizing and a closer connec-
tion between workers and elected officials 
can lead to more victories and improved 
worker protections. This manual proposes 
a broad array of changes to law and policy 
in an effort to give workers and their ad-
vocates in every locality a starting point for 
discussing new campaign ideas. By col-
lecting these ideas and presenting them to 
advocates around the nation, we hope to 
have achieved a modest first step toward big 
improvements in workers’ health and safety. 
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appendix: Overview of the OSH 
Act and workers’ Compensation
FED-OSHA AnD THE OSH ACT
The occupational Safety and Health act (oSH 
act) is a federal law enacted by the U.S. con-
gress in 1970. It established a new federal 
agency—the occupational Safety and Health 
administration (oSHa), within the U.S. Depart-
ment of labor—to develop and enforce occupa-
tional health and safety standards. The agency 
is charged with developing and enforcing a 
variety of workplace safety standards.
The law also established a process whereby 
states could petition fed-oSHa to recognize a 
state agency as an effective replacement for the 
federal program in that state. Upon recognition 
and after a period of “concurrent jurisdiction” 
meant to ensure a smooth transition, the “state-
plan” agency has full authority to establish and 
enforce occupational health and safety stan-
dards. fed-oSHa does not extend oSH act 
protections to public-sector employees (e.g., 
police, firefighters, teachers, etc.), but approved 
state-plan agencies do. Twenty-one states and 
puerto rico have gone through this process and 
established “state-plan” agencies that establish 
and enforce standards within their jurisdictions. 
four other states and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
have obtained fed-oSHa’s approval to operate 
partial state plans that cover only public-sector 
workers (fed-oSHa retains jurisdiction over 
private-sector workplaces). 
fed-oSHa has its headquarters in Washington, 
D.c., but most inspection work is conducted 
out of area offices at the state and local levels. 
Inspections are initiated for a variety of rea-
sons. Many are prompted by a complaint from 
a worker, a reported fatality or injury, or even 
an inspector noticing something amiss while 
driving down the road. Sometimes other gov-
ernment agencies refer cases to fed-oSHa. 
roughly 60 percent of oSHa inspections are 
scheduled through its system for randomly 
selecting worksites and its industry- or hazard-
specific “emphasis programs.” State-plan states 
operate in a similar fashion, although their 
emphasis programs often target industries that 
present unique challenges in their geographical 
jurisdictions.
The oSH act also established the occupa-
tional Safety and Health review commission. 
When an employer challenges a citation issued 
by fed-oSHa, the case is litigated before an 
administrative law judge and can be appealed 
to the review commission. The review com-
mission’s decisions are reviewable in federal 
appellate court. State plans also give employers 
an opportunity to challenge citations through 
an administrative process and ultimately ap-
peal the decision in a court, although the exact 
procedures vary from state to state.
wORKERS’ COMPEnSATiOn
In every state but Texas, employers are required 
to carry workers’ compensation insurance that 
will pay medical expenses for employees in-
jured or made ill on the job and replace income 
for those who are out of work recovering for 
extended periods of time. States have different 
laws spelling out which employers must have 
coverage. Texas does not require any employ-
ers to have workers’ compensation coverage, 
while california requires anyone with at least 
one employee to have the insurance. In many 
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states, smaller employers or employers in cer-
tain industries, such as agriculture, are exempt 
from this requirement. If injured workers miss a 
certain number of consecutive work days—three 
days in many states, seven in others—they are 
entitled to receive payments equal to a portion 
of their wages for the time they are unable to 
work. 
Ideally, the workers’ compensation system 
encourages prevention by offering lower pre-
miums to employers who keep their workplaces 
healthy and safe. The system should also ensure 
that workers who are injured at work or who 
suffer job-related illnesses get prompt care that 
allows them to recover and return to work, and 
that those who must miss several days of work—
or, in the worst cases, cannot work again—re-
ceive prompt cash payments and avoid severe 
financial hardship.
In many cases, however, the system simply does 
not work as it should to encourage prevention 
and give prompt assistance to injured and ill 
workers. Some employers who are required to 
have insurance may avoid purchasing it or lie 
about what kind of workers they employ. Some 
keep their workers’ compensation premiums 
low by pressuring workers not to file workers’ 
compensation claims, or by fighting the claims 
in administrative proceedings. Insurers generally 
also argue that occupational diseases cannot 
be proven to have stemmed from a particular 
workplace exposure, so workers with occupa-
tional illnesses receive compensation much too 
rarely. adjudication of workers’ compensation 
claims can be a lengthy process, and in some 
cases workers face long delays before getting 
the medical care or cash benefits they desper-
ately need, and to which they are entitled.
Many workers have reported feeling helpless 
and harassed when they tried to secure com-
pensation, and stories of these difficulties can 
discourage other workers from filing compen-
sation claims. as a result, workers’ families, 
private health insurers, and public programs 
like Medicaid and Social Security end up bear-
ing costs that should have been covered by the 
workers’ compensation system.
Some states are working to improve their work-
ers’ compensation systems, but sometimes 
efforts for “reform” are aimed at reducing 
employers’ costs without improving prevention 
or compensation for workers. In recent years, 
advocates have come together to fight efforts 
to decrease maximum dollar amounts or time 
limits for workers’ compensation benefits.    
To learn more, visit the nonprofit website Work-
ers’ comp Hub, (http://workerscomphub.org), 
a project of the National council on occupa-
tional Safety & Health (National coSH) and 
the National economic & Social rights Initiative 
(NeSrI). The site offers resources on the work-
ers’ compensation system in general, as well 
as specifics for programs in various states; for 
instance, pennsylvania workers can download 
philapoSH’s Injured on the Job handbook.114 
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